

**OPTICAL ENCODING BASED ON  
SINGLE PIXEL IMAGING**

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**A project report submitted in partial fulfilment of the  
requirements for the award of Bachelor of Engineering  
(Honours) Electrical and Electronic Engineering**

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**April 2021**

**DECLARATION**

I hereby declare that this project report is based on my original work except for citations and quotations which have been duly acknowledged. I also declare that it has not been previously and concurrently submitted for any other degree or award at UTAR or other institutions.

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**APPROVAL FOR SUBMISSION**

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## ABSTRACT

Single Pixel Imaging (SPI) is an imaging framework that utilises only one light detector instead of detector arrays required by conventional imaging sensors. This is achieved by sequentially applying a series of mask patterns and measures the light intensity using the single light detector. The measurements correspond to the mask patterns can then be used to reconstruct the image. SPI is inherently encrypted, since the light intensity collected cannot be related to the original image in any way or form, and can only be reconstructed based on the mask patterns used. Thus, the collected light intensities can be perceived as the ciphertext and the configuration of mask patterns is the key.

Due to the inherent property of SPI, its encryption security and performance were studied. The image acquisition and reconstruction are essentially optical encoding and decoding process. Various SPI encoding and decoding schemes were investigated, which include Hadamard, random, Fourier, and Chaotic. The findings from the analysis of these existing schemes suggest the need of a new encryption method. The proposed method is essentially a double encryption that utilises the mixing of logistic chaotic maps using random index map at the first phase and Double Random Phase Encoding (DRPE) or Rivest–Shamir–Adleman Encryption (RSA) at the second phase. Assessment was performed from the perspectives of reconstruction quality and security analysis. Besides, the proposed method was also compared to the existing encryption schemes. The results show that the proposed method has average performance in term of image reconstruction quality at low sampling rate but has significant improvement in term of security. Therefore, the proposed method is able to overcome the shortcomings regarding the security of conventional SPI encoding schemes.

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## LIST OF SYMBOLS / ABBREVIATIONS

$(x, y)$	pixel position
$\emptyset$	SPI measurement matrix
$\otimes$	convolution
$a$	luminance weightage
$A, B$	2-dimentional distribution
$b$	contrast weightage
$c$	column index
$c$	structure weightage
$C_Q$	ciphertext
$\epsilon$	minimum value to prevent zero error
$K_m$	illumination pattern
$M$	number of measurements
$MAX_I$	maximum value of pixel of image
$N$	number of pixels
$O_Q$	plaintext
$r$	row index
$x$	image vector
$z_{fi}$	processed pixel value
$z_{oi}$	initial pixel value
$\Omega$	solid angle of the light cone
$i$	complex number
$\nu, \mu, \xi, \eta$	frequency
$\alpha$	sparse coefficient
$\sigma$	noise
$\varphi$	sparse basis
$\varphi(n)$	Euler's totient function
ART	Arnold transform
CC	correlation coefficient
COA	ciphertext-only attack
CPA	chosen plaintext attack

CS	compressed sensing
DRPE	double random phase encoding
FPA	focal point array
FRT	fractional Fourier transform
FST	Fresnel transform
FT	Fourier Transform
GPRA	generalized phase retrieval algorithm
GT	Gyrator transform
HT	Hartley transform
IM	index map
JT	jigsaw transform
KPA	known phase attack
LCT	linear canonical transform
MP	modulated patterns
MSE	mean square error
OMP	orthogonal matching pursuit
PSNR	peak signal to noise ratio
RIM	random index map
RMSE	root mean square error
RSA	Rivest-Shamir-Adleman
SNR	signal to noise ratio
SPI	single pixel imaging
SSIM	structural similarity index
TC	total curvature
TV	total variation

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### 1.1 General Introduction

Single Pixel Imaging (SPI) is an optical imaging method where image acquisition is done by only a single pixel detector. In comparison with modern digital cameras, silicon focal point array (FPA) sensor is used to detect an image which is made up of millions of pixels (Edgar, Gibson and Padgett, 2019). One might ask how can a single pixel detects and reconstruct an image when the pixel can only detect the intensity of light. This is done by illuminating the target image with arrays of patterned light, and then recording the array of intensity of light with a single pixel detector. The light pattern and the light intensity array recorded can be used to reconstruct the image based on algorithms and principles of compressed sensing (CS).

Based on the image reconstruction method stated just now, it is observed that SPI imaging is basically going through an encoding and decoding process. For every image acquisition and reconstruction, the key is the pattern array. Thus, SPI is inherently more secure compared to conventional imaging methods. Encoding or encryption is the recording of information with the intention of hiding its true information and only authorise the true information to the intended or authorised person with the decoding key. Encryption of information can be dated back to ancient times where secret information are being transmitted as symbols and sketches. Thus, this project will study the optical encoding based on SPI to further improve the security of the SPI scheme.

#### 1.2 Importance of the Study

SPI method is a fast-growing field that is studied by many researchers. The reason for this is that industrial application requires low costing cameras, SPI provides this advantage as only one-pixel sensor is needed to record the image. This advantage is further amplified when recording non-visible light spectrum images as light detector that is outside of the visible spectrum is significantly more expensive than the normal detectors. It is also notable that SPI is able to sense compressively, therefore reducing the data storage and data transferring requirements (Edgar, Gibson and Padgett, 2019).



In this study, the main focus is on the encoding of SPI. The inherent advantage of SPI can be further enhanced. By improving the security of the SPI scheme, SPI scheme might become the leading optical imaging method for secret image transfer. Thus, studies are to be done on the performance of encryption methods in order to evaluate its feasibility so that it can be referenced to in the future when developing a more secured, cost effective and high-performance SPI encoding scheme.

### **1.3 Problem Statement**

Encryption of information needs to be updated and new encryption methods need to be introduced as new attacking methods are developed. Thus, to make sure that the secret image is secured, new SPI encoding method can be studied. Besides security, the performance of the encoding scheme must also be considered. Most encoding method will cause some alteration to the image when the image is encoded and decoded. Thus, performance analysis is needed to identify the quality of the image retrieved. Although there are multiple studies regarding SPI encoding methods, there is lack of comprehensive security analysis as they are mainly focus on quality analysis. For instance, “A Novel Compressive Optical Encryption via Single-Pixel Imaging” by Zhang et al. (2019a). Therefore, multiple security analysis is done to fill in this research gap.

### **1.4 Aims and Objectives**

In order to solve the problem statement mentioned above, three objectives for this project have been identified.

1. To review the SPI and different encoding and decoding schemes. This is important to establish a comprehensive understanding on SPI as well as different encoding methods.
2. Design a novel encryption method based on SPI to improve the security of encryption.
3. To analyse the performance of the designed method and available methods. This validated and proves the feasibility of the method.

### **1.5 Scope and Limitation of the Study**

The scope of this study includes the literature review of SPI, image performance analysis, encryption security and multiple encryption methods. In particular, encoding and decoding process of SPI were investigated. It is hoped to propose a secure double encryption method as part of the study. Accordingly, the proposed method was compared with other SPI encryption methods to compare its performance using suitable metrics.

In this study, MATLAB was used as the main tool to simulate the results. Selected datasets that are adequate for the study were used and analysed. No physical test bench will be constructed. Thus, there will be limitation to the result as some real-world conditions might not be considered in the simulations.

### **1.6 Contribution of the Study**

The project will contribute to the research gap of the security evaluation of SPI encoding framework. Many data in information on the SPI encoding, its strengths and weaknesses will be explored and revealed. Besides that, a more secure SPI based encryption framework is developed in order to overcome the shortcoming of available SPI encoding methods. Through this project, further understanding is gained in terms of the security and the potential of SPI in image cryptography.

### **1.7 Outline of the Report**

This report is divided into five chapters. The first chapter introduces the problem statement and objectives of the project. Chapter 2 reviews SPI and other encoding frameworks. It also reviews the Mathematic theory that is often used in encryption. Besides, similar studies that are relevant to this project is also studied. Next, Chapter 3 presents the work flow of the simulation, the software used for the simulation, security and quality evaluation metrics used, and the methodology of the proposed encryption method. Chapter 4 displays the result and discussion of the project. It is separated into available SPI encoding method simulations and proposed encryption method simulation results and comparisons. Finally, Chapter 5 concludes the whole project and gives insight to what can be improved and the limitation of the project.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

#### 2.1 Introduction

The most popular image acquisition method in the market right now is based on sensor arrays, and pixel counts in cameras nowadays have become a performance metric as well as marketing strategy. Though, the developing SPI method is found to have some competitive advantages compared to the conventional cameras.

The working principle of SPI inherently encodes the image, thus presents better security compared to conventional image acquisition methods. The image is illuminated with spatially modulated light patterns and the reflected light is detected and recorded with a single pixel detector as intensity array. The key in this process for the encoding and decoding is the illumination pattern array. The ciphertext is then the array of light intensity recorded with a single pixel detector, hence SPI. The typical process of encoding and decoding of SPI is shown in Figure 2.1 below.




Figure 2.1: Illustration of SPI system

SPI generally makes use of Compressed Sensing (CS) technique. CS is a digital signal processing method to obtain and reconstruct a signal efficiently from an undetermined system of linear equation. It is highly advantageous as it can reconstruct signals when the signal collected is below the Nyquist rate. For example, for a 50x50 pixel image, SPI system does not need to collect 50x50 set of intensity readings to reconstruct the image fully. It can reconstruct the image with less

readings. The condition to use CS is that the signal is inherently sparse in some domain. In a natural image, this criterion is fulfilled as its wavelet domain is sparse (Rani, Dhok and Deshmukh, 2018).

In the literature review, details of SPI and CS will be discussed. Besides, studies that have similar objectives as this project is reviewed.

## 2.2 Single Pixel Imaging

SPI is an image acquisition and reconstruction method that utilizes CS concepts to reconstruct the image. As mentioned before, the image acquisition method is using masked patterns to form illumination patterns onto the target image and the light intensity is recorded. To cater the compressed sensing reconstruction, the masks pattern used are considered.

It is generally common to use a method that does not match the spatial properties of the image, such as random pattern (Edgar, Gibson and Padgett, 2019). Though, this method usually takes more time and can make the reconstruction time to greatly exceed the acquisition time. Thus, this method is not suitable for applications that requires real time performance.

The other approach on the mask pattern is to use pattern that are not totally incoherent with the spatial properties of the image, such as the Hadamard or Fourier masks. This method trades some image quality for speed, thus are more suitable for real time applications (Edgar, Gibson and Padgett, 2019).

Mathematically, image, denoted as  $x$  can be considered as a  $N \times 1$  matrix of  $N$  unknown intensities. The mask pattern basis is denoted as  $\emptyset$ , which is a  $M \times N$  matrix of 0 and 1 to represent the transmitted and blocked light. The measured signal is  $y$ , which is the product of  $x$  and  $\emptyset$ , which is expressed in the Eq. (2.1).

$$y = \emptyset x \quad (2.1)$$

The image  $x$  is sparse in nature, thus are represented by a sparse basis  $\varphi$  and its coefficient which are the uncompressed image denoted by  $\alpha$  which is  $K$ -sparse. This means that only  $K$  number of coefficients in  $\alpha$  are non-zero. The equation of  $x$  is shown in Eq. (2.2).

$$x = \varphi \alpha \quad (2.2)$$

Thus, the equation of the measured signal becomes

$$y = \Phi \varphi \alpha \quad (2.3)$$

The measurement basis matrix  $\Phi$  should be maximally incoherent with the sparse basis  $\varphi$ , such as using random binary pattern (Edgar, Gibson and Padgett, 2019). In order to reconstruct the image when the number of measurements is less than pixels  $M < N$  some CS algorithms are used. The image in the transform domain can be reconstructed when the number of sampling patterns used is  $M \geq O(K \log(\frac{N}{K}))$  by solving an optimization problem (Edgar, Gibson and Padgett, 2019). One of the optimization methods that can be used are the  $\ell_1$  minimization, which can be expressed as

$$\alpha^* = \arg \min \|\alpha\|_1 \text{ subject to } y = \Phi \varphi \alpha \quad (2.4)$$

where the pixel domain representation of image  $x^*$  can be calculated through

$$x^* = \varphi \alpha^* \quad (2.5)$$

There are also other optimization methods that can be used such as the total variation (TV) minimization and the total curvature (TC) minimization.

For real life practice, the data measured will be suspected to noise  $\sigma$  which comes from the instability of light source and electronic readout noise from the detector. Thus, the equation considering the noise are represented by

$$\alpha^* = \arg \min \|\alpha\|_1 \text{ subject to } \|y - \Phi \varphi \alpha\|_2 \leq \sigma \quad (2.6)$$

### 2.3 Compressed Sensing (CS)

CS is developed and introduced by Donoho, Candes, Romberg and Tao in 2004 and is used for the acquisition of sparse or compressible signals (Rani, Dhok and Deshmukh, 2018). Sparsity means that the signal has only few significant parts, where most of the data is equal or close to zero. This method saves data storage as most traditional signal acquisition methods need to follow the Nyquist criterion, causes too many redundant data is recorded when the signal is sparse. CS enable signal acquisition and deconstruction that discards the non-significant data, thus taking fewer measurements.

The image acquisition algorithm in 2.2 is essentially the compressed sensing signal acquisition algorithm. Number of measurement matrix  $M$  is less than the length of input signal  $N$ . Due the sparse property of natural image, the complete reconstruction can be done using CS with  $M$  proportional with sparsity of image  $K$ . Figure 2.2 shows the acquisition process based on CS.




Figure 2.2: Signal acquisition process based on CS (Rani, Dhok and Deshmukh, 2018)

## 2.4 Optical Image Encryption

Optical encoding takes advantage of the coherent nature of the laser beam to obtain efficient encrypted data as well as high speed decryption through parallel processing (Glückstad and Palima, 2009). It is also able to encrypt information in multiple dimensions.

### 2.4.1 Double Random Phase Encoding

One very important optical encryption technique that serves as the basis for many optical encryption methods now is the double random phase encoding (DRPE) (Alfalou and Brosseau, 2009).

The general idea of this technique is encrypting the image into a stationary white noise by altering its spectrum. In DRPE, both amplitude and phase spectrum are altered to encrypt the information securely, since there are ways to reconstruct the image with only phase or amplitude information (Alfalou and Brosseau, 2009). The process can be mathematically explained as follows. the image represented by  $I(x, y)$  are to be multiplied with a first key which is a random phase mask  $RP_1$ .  $RP_1$  can be expressed as

$$RP_1 = \exp(i2\pi n(x, y)) \quad (2.7)$$

where

$n(x, y)$  = white noise that are uniformly distributed in  $[0, 1]$

After that, it is multiplied by a second encryption key which is a second random phase mask in Fourier domain. The key is expressed as

$$RP_2 = \exp(i2\pi b(v, \mu)) \quad (2.8)$$

where

$b(v, \mu)$  = white noise that is uniformly distributed in  $[0, 1]$  independent of  $n(x, y)$

In this way, the image is encrypted. The encryption process that fully represents the process is

$$I_c(x, y) = (I(x, y) \exp(i2\pi n(x, y))) \otimes h(x, y) \quad (2.9)$$

where

$\otimes$  = convolution

$h(x, y) = FT^{-1}[RP_2]$

This method can be implemented optically through a setup illustrated in Figure 2.3 below, where the lenses perform Fourier transform (FT) optically.




Figure 2.3: Optical implementation of DRP (Alfalou and Brosseau, 2009)

To decode the encrypted image, FT of  $I_c(x, y)$  is multiplied with conjugate of  $RP_2$ . Then, its inverse FT will be  $|I(x, y) \exp(i2\pi n(x, y))|^2 = |I(x, y)|^2$ .

Besides using FT for DRP, different types of transforms such as fractional Fourier transform (FRT), Fresnel transform (FST), linear Canonical transform (LCT), Gyrator transform (GT), and Hartley transform (HT) can also be used (Liu, Guo and Sheridan, 2014).

## 2.5 Rivest–Shamir–Adleman Encryption (RSA)

Rivest-Shamir-Adleman Encryption (RSA) is a public key cryptosystem which is named after its developers. A public key cryptosystem, also known as asymmetric cryptosystem, is done by using two different keys. The two keys are the public key and the private key. The private key cannot be derived from the public key, which makes it safe to publish the encryption key without risking the leak of the private key. RSA cryptosystem utilises the property of field of number theory, where it is simple to multiply two large prime numbers to generate a composite number, but it is very hard to do the reverse (Zhao, et al., 2010). There is still no effective algorithm to do an efficient decomposition yet.

In order to perform RSA, there are a few steps that need to be followed. First, two distinct prime numbers,  $p$  and  $q$  are chosen and their product,  $n$  is calculated as shown in Eq. (2.10)

$$n = pq \quad (2.10)$$

Next, encryption key,  $e$  is generated where it should be less than the Euler's totient function  $\varphi(n)$  and more than 1.  $e$  must also be the coprime of  $\varphi(n)$ . The Euler totient function  $\varphi(n)$  is expressed as

$$\varphi(n) = (p - 1)(q - 1) \quad (2.11)$$

Finally, the decryption key,  $d$  is calculated. The calculation is shown in Eq. (2.12)

$$d = e^{-1} \text{mod } \varphi(n) \quad (2.12)$$

The public key is  $(e, n)$  while the private key is  $(d, n)$ . The private key,  $d$  must be kept secret. The values of  $p$ ,  $q$ , and  $\varphi(n)$  should also be kept secret because it is possible to calculate the private key using these values.

After preparing the keys, the encryption and decryption process can be performed. The encryption and decryption process can be represented by Eq. (2.13) and Eq. (2.14) respectively.

$$c = m^e \text{ (mod } n) \quad (2.13)$$

$$m = c^d \text{ (mod } n) \quad (2.14)$$

where



$c$  = ciphertext

$m$  = plaintext

The security of RSA relies on the difficulty to factorize integers. In this case, the difficulty to factorise  $n$ . Factorising  $n$  to  $p$  and  $q$  is the most obvious way to attack the cryptosystem. But as mentioned before, this is a very hard problem to be solved. This is especially true when  $n$  is large. Thus,  $p$  and  $q$  should be large enough so that it is more secure, subjecting to the specific usage of the encryption (Zhou and Tang, 2011).

## 2.6 Chaotic Maps

Chaotic map is a mapping that exhibits chaotic characteristics. It is derived from chaos theory which is a branch of mathematics that handles nonlinear dynamical systems (Boeing, 2016). The term nonlinear indicates that the change in the system output is not proportional to the input due to feedback or multiplicative effects. Meanwhile, dynamical systems indicates that the system changes over time depending on the current state. Chaotic systems exhibit random like behaviour. It may be derived from a simple looking equation with few interactive parts but it is very sensitive to initial conditions and can result in a completely different sequence when a very small change is applied to it. Despite their deterministic simplicity, as the system changes over time the output can become extremely unpredictable and divergent.

The unpredictable, random, and sensitivity to key nature of the chaotic systems makes it a highly studied and applied technique for encryption (Agarwal, 2018). There are many kinds of different chaotic maps that are utilised for encryption. Here, we will discuss about a simple one-dimensional chaotic map – the Logistic map. The equation that defines the logistic map is shown in Eq. (2.15).

$$x_{n+1} = rx_n(1 - x_n) \quad (2.15)$$

where

$x$  = population

$n$  = number of iterations

$r$  = growth rate

Growth rate is a very important parameter as the population might not be chaotic at certain growth rate. For instance, with growth rate of 0.5, the population will settle to 0 after many iterations. The relationship between the population and generations of iteration based on different growth rate are shown in Figure 2.4. Note that the population starts with 0.5 in this example.




Figure 2.4: Logistic model result, by growth rate. (Boeing, 2016)

Attractor is the value where the system settles toward after many iterations. In the case where growth rate is 0.5, the system will have one point attractor at 0. When the growth rate is less than 3.5, the logistic system is not yet chaotic since it only has limited number of attractor that the system oscillates around. When growth rate is more than 3.5, the system will have a strange attractor where the system will oscillate forever and will not repeat or settle to a steady state. A bifurcation diagram shows this more clearly as it plots the relationship between the attractor and the growth rate. The bifurcation diagram of logistic map is shown in Figure 2.5.




Figure 2.5: Bifurcation diagram of logistic map. (Boeing, 2016)

## 2.7 Similar Studies

### 2.7.1 A Novel Compressive Optical Encryption via Single-Pixel Imaging

Zhang et al. (2019a) proposed a novel compressive optical encryption via SPI. The study involves the theory of their encryption and results, both in simulation and real-life experiment with an optical setup.

The key of their proposed SPI encryption lies in the random index map (RIM) which consists of 0 and 1s. The RIM is generated as the secret key. The column and row index of the 1s in the RIM corresponds to a Fourier basis subset which forms the measurement matrix  $\Phi$  mentioned in the SPI explanation. Thus, we can say that the RIM has the information of illumination pattern encrypted. The illustration of the system is shown in Figure 2.6.




Figure 2.6: (a)RIM. (b)Cosine fringe corresponding to a value of 1 in the RIM.  
(c)Optical encryption system based on SPI. (Zhang, et al., 2019a)

To explain the relationship between the pattern and RIM, assume that a  $256 \times 256$  RIM is generated with 16000 1s. The row index is denoted as  $r$  and column index as  $c$ . When there is a 1 in the RIM, its row and column index will be used to formulate the cosine and sine fringes in the Fourier basis. It is expressed as

$$p_c(\mu, v) = \cos[2\pi c\mu + 2\pi rv] \quad (2.16)$$

$$p_s(\mu, v) = \sin[2\pi c\mu + 2\pi rv] \quad (2.17)$$

where

$p_c(\mu, v)$  = cosine fringe

$p_s(\mu, v)$  = sine fringe

The fringes are then generated by computer and the light with fringes pattern are projected to the target image. Its resulting signal can be expressed as

$$I(\mu, v) = p(\mu, v)x(\mu, v) \quad (2.18)$$

where

$p(\mu, v)$  =  $p_s$  or  $p_c$

$I(\mu, v)$  = reflectance function of the target image

By recording all of the signals with a single pixel detector, the result can be expressed as

$$y(i) \int_{\Omega} p_i(\mu, v)x(\mu, v)d\mu dv \quad (2.19)$$

This is analogous to the SPI scheme expressed in equation (2.1), where  $x$  is the column vector reshaped from  $x(\mu, v)$ ,  $\Phi$  represents the measurement matrix whose rows is the fringe  $p(\mu, v)$  that are reshaped to a row. In this case,  $\Phi$  will be a 32000 x 65536 matrix while  $y$  will be a 32000 x 1 column matrix.

The decryption method used in this study utilizes TV minimization. The decryption process can be expressed as Eq. (2.3).

The result obtained from simulation and experiment are compared using a metric called correlation coefficient (CC). The result of CC ranges from 0 to 1 where 0 is the worst and 1 is the best. Zhang et al. (2019a) experimented with the number of sampling done, denoted by  $M$ . The results of simulation and experiment are shown in Figure 2.7.




Figure 2.7: Relationship between  $M$  and CC for simulation and experiment (Zhang, et al., 2019a)

Besides quality analysis, the writer also analysed their cryptosystem by attempting to crack the ciphertext in 3 ways, namely the inverse FT of ciphertext, using counterfeit RIM and brute force search of the correct RIM. For the first two methods, the ciphertext cannot be decrypted and gives out a noise pattern result. For

brute search of known RIM, the number of permutations is too large that the ciphertext cannot be decoded in short time.

To conclude the study, Zhang et al. (2019a) has successfully designed a SPI encryption method that is secure and has high reconstruction quality.

### 2.7.2 Compressive optical steganography via single-pixel imaging

Zhang, He et al. (2019) has suggested compressive optical steganography via SPI. Steganography is a method whereby the secret information is hidden inside another source of data that is not suspicious. In this study, Zhang et al. (2019b) designed a steganography technique via SPI, and made simulations and experiments to analyse the performance of the technique.

The steganography proposed by Zhang et al. (2019b) can be explained in two parts, the embedding and extraction of information. In the embedding process, an image secret image is concealed inside a host image. The host image can be decoded by anyone with inverse FT. The secret image can only be accessed using the correct key. The overall look on the system is shown in Figure 2.8.




Figure 2.8: Overall look of the steganography system (Zhang, et al., 2019)

The secret image is first undergone FT. To embed the secret image, an index map (IM) of 180x180 pixels is generated. In the IM there are 5265 1s. Indices of the IM is used to form a 10530x32400 measurement matrix denoted by  $\emptyset$ . The secret image is sparse sampled with  $\emptyset$  just like the SPI method shown in equation 2.1. The resulting data is compressed, where the compressed data is denoted as  $y$ .

After that,  $y$  is embedded into the Fourier spectrum of the host image which has a resolution of 256x256 pixels. The embedding process is done according to a

RIM which represents the secret key. Modulated patterns (MP) need to be constructed to embed the host image using the SPI system. The MP which contains the information to the secret image is used to illuminate the host image to enable the image to be acquired by a SPI system. The result of the acquired signal can be expressed as Eq. (2.20).

$$y(i) = \int_{\Omega} h(\mu, v)MP(\mu, v)d\mu dv \quad (2.20)$$

where

$MP(\mu, v)$  = modulated patterns

$h(\mu, v)$  =host image.

Based on the integral property of FT, Eq. (2.19) can be expressed as

$$y(i) = FT[h(\mu, v)MP(\mu, v)](\xi, \eta)|_{\xi=0, \eta=0} \quad (2.21)$$

The MP can be found by using a generalized phase retrieval algorithm (GPRA). The algorithm is repeated until the MP converges. The algorithm is done in 3 steps. Firstly, a  $MP_k$  is generated for initialization. Then FT is performed on  $h(\mu, v)MP_k(\mu, v)$  and the constrain shown in Eq. (2.21) is imposed. Lastly, inverse FT is done on the result in step 2 to get  $hm_{update}$ . It will be used to calculate the new MP. The update calculation can be expressed as

$$MP_{k+1} = \frac{hm_{update}}{h(u,v)+eps} \quad (2.22)$$

where

$eps$  = minimum to prevent zero error

The flowchart of the steganography is shown in Figure 2.9.




Figure 2.9: Flowchart of the steganography(Zhang, et al., 2019)

For extraction of secret image from stegoimage, the spectrum of the secret image can be obtained from the stegoimage according to RIM. Then,  $\emptyset$  is produced with IM and the secret image can be reconstructed using the CS method. TV minimization is used to reconstruct the image. It is noted that this reconstruction is same as the SPI reconstruction method, as both are based on CS.

The results obtained from simulation are evaluated with CC. The relationship between image reconstruction quality and the size of the embedded image is studied. The reconstructed test secret image obtained a CC of 0.9956 when compared with the original secret image. This shows that the reconstruction quality is very good and will not affect the quality of the secret image. The CC of host image and stegoimage is also very high, which is 0.9776. This shows that the host image undergoes minimal changes after embedded with the secret image. It is found that when the pixel number of the secret image increase while the size of the host image remains the same, the CC between host image and stegoimage decreases. The CC between the retrieved image and secret image remains almost identical. Therefore, to increase the embedding capacity while maintain the quality of stegoimage, the size of the stegoimage need to be increased.

For optical experiments, the CC between secret image and retrieved image is still at a very high level, which indicates that the steganography system is very robust. However, the signal to noise ratio (SNR) is not very good, and as the detection distance increase, the SNR becomes worse.



## 2.8 Attacks on Encrypted Single Pixel Imaging

In order to understand more about the security of SPI encoding, the attack method on SPI is studied. In this section, a study done by Jiao et al. (2019) titled “Known-Plaintext Attack and Ciphertext-Only Attack for Encrypted Single-Pixel Imaging” is reviewed.

The usual attacks on image encryption are the chosen-plaintext attack (CPA), known-plaintext attack (KPA) and ciphertext-only attack (COA). In terms of CPA, assumption is made that the attacker is able to access to the encryption system and dictate the input plaintext. Key can be recovered by selecting a few pair of ciphertext and plaintext and analyse it. This attack is not analysed because the situation where the attacker can access to the encryption system is not likely. For KPA, the attacker has a few random plaintext-ciphertext pairs. This situation happens more in real life situations and can poses higher threat. For COA, the attacker only has a few ciphertext and does not have any information on plaintext. COA analysis on an encryption system is very important because it can reveal serious problem on the cryptography system as it indicates that the system only needs very few information to be cracked. This method is the hardest to implement for an attacker.

Now, KPA on encrypted SPI system will be analysed. Plaintext can only be retrieved from the ciphertext with the correct key. It is high risk when the same key is repeatedly used to encrypt an image. The attacker can find out the key from analysing the cyphertext intensity sequences and collect its plaintext pair. The way of finding the key which is the illumination pattern similar to the way of reconstruction of SPI image. Assume the “illumination patterns” are plaintext images and the “plaintext image” as an illumination pattern. This can be illustrated in Eq. (2.23)

$$\begin{bmatrix} O_1(1) & O_1(2) & \cdots & O_1(N) \\ O_2(1) & O_2(2) & \cdots & O_2(N) \\ \vdots & \vdots & \ddots & \vdots \\ O_Q(1) & O_Q(2) & \cdots & O_Q(N) \end{bmatrix} \begin{bmatrix} K_m(1) \\ K_m(2) \\ \vdots \\ K_m(N) \end{bmatrix} = \begin{bmatrix} C_1(m) \\ C_2(m) \\ \vdots \\ C_Q(m) \end{bmatrix} \quad (2.23)$$

where

$O_Q$  = plaintext,  $Q = 1, 2, \dots, M$

$K_m$  = illumination pattern

$C_Q$  = ciphertext.

This is analogous to Eq. (2.1). Thus, the  $m^{\text{th}}$  illumination pattern can be found using SPI reconstruction method. Once all illumination pattern from  $m = 1$  to  $m = M$  is found, the illumination patterns are put combined together to form  $\emptyset$  which is the  $M \times N$  SPI measurement matrix, the key to the encryption system.

For COA on encrypted SPI system, only the ciphertext are known. Recovery using that little information is extremely hard. In the experiment done by Jiao et al. (2014), they only found an algorithm to crack the SPI encoding key when under certain conditions. The conditions are that the pixel values of illumination patterns before permutation are known, and assumption is made that the same category of images are repetitively encrypted with SPI. The attacker can collect many example images that are similar to the actual encrypted image. To find the original illumination pattern permutation sequence, the attacker can use the example images and use the known illumination pattern to illuminate the image and record its intensity. After finishing this process with all known illumination pattern, the intensities data recorded is compared with its ciphertext counterpart. The illumination pattern will be arranged based on the best fitting match. Thus, the key is retrieved.

The key cracked using KPA is very accurate as based on the experiment done by Jiao et al. (2014), the key recovered shows very high similarity that exceeds 99.8% compared to the original key. When using the cracked key to decode the test image, the reconstructed image has acceptable quality with a peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR) of over 16dB. This KPA scheme can only be successfully done when the plaintext-ciphertext pairs are enough, which is equal to  $M$ . When encrypted image is decrypted using a random key, noise like image is retrieved. Thus, it can be said that the SPI system has good security when the key is not known.

For the key cracked with COA, the scheme proposed by Jiao et al. (2014) produces key in which its effectiveness decreases as the image size increases. When the ciphertext and example image pair increase, the quality of the key retrieved from the scheme will increase. In the proposed COA scheme, the plaintext must be similar and belong to the same category in order to successfully find out the key. if the plaintext is totally of different category, none of the illumination pattern will be recovered in the correct order (Jiao, et al., 2019) .

## **2.9 Summary**

In this literature review, many important information related to SPI encoding and optical encryption are studied. The mathematics part of SPI, CS, DRPE, RSA, and chaotic systems are studied in order to fully understand and implement the information in this study. Besides that, a few studies related to the project are discussed. Literatures are reviewed to get a fundamental background and improve planning in this project. The security of SPI is also analysed by analysing the attack method and effectiveness to fully understand the security of SPI. The research gap noticed when studying the literature is the lack of in-depth encryption system studies on SPI. This is the reason that this project will try to tackle the under researched area by developing a new SPI based encryption system and analyse its performance.

## CHAPTER 3

### METHODOLOGY AND WORK PLAN

#### 3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the simulation framework for our investigation is explained. Besides, the steps done to compare different SPI encoding methods are explained. The quality and security measurement method are also presented. Furthermore, the proposed new SPI based encryption method is explained clearly in order to enable future reproduction of results. Lastly, the planning of this project, is shown through the Gantt chart.

#### 3.2 Simulation Tool

The development of double encryption method and the experiment to evaluate its performance are done fully through simulation. MATLAB is used because of its powerful numerical computation functions especially on matrices, which involved heavily in image processing. The SPI encoding schemes that are commonly used, namely Hadamard, Fourier and random sampling can be simulated by functions available in MATLAB. For instance, N Hadamard masks can be produced by using `hadamard(N)` function easily.

For CS reconstruction schemes, some common approaches such as L1 optimization, TV optimization and matching pursuit can also be performed easily with MATLAB. The libraries for the optimization methods are available in MATLAB, thus simplifying the process. For instance, `l1dantzig_pd` function is used as a L1 minimization method to reconstruct the final image.

#### 3.3 Investigation of SPI Encoding Methods

Four existing SPI encoding methods namely Hadamard, random, Fourier and chaotic logistic are chosen and simulated using MATLAB, which are explained in the next section. Four different images are used as test image for SPI encoding. The images that are used for simulation is shown in Figure 3.1. Each image is simulated four times with sampling ratio of 0.25, 0.5, 0.75, and 1. This is to evaluate the performance of the encryption at different sampling ratio, as one of the advantages of

SPI is it utilises CS so that image can be reconstructed with less information than conventional imaging framework.




Figure 3.1: Images used for simulation.

### 3.3.1 Process Flow

The methods investigated in this project are Hadamard, random, Fourier, and chaotic. The process flow of the simulation of these methods are shown in Figure 3.2.




Figure 3.2: Flowchart of the simulation

First, an image is encoded with SPI method using the patterns stated. Subsequently, security analysis is performed on the ciphertext to evaluate its security. The metrics used for the security measurement are further explained in Section 3.3.2. After that, the image is reconstructed through L1 optimisation. L1 optimisation is chosen because it has the best security as compared to TV minimization and OMP (Xiong, et

al., 2020). Finally, performance analysis is done on the reconstructed image by using the original image as the reference. That is further explained in Section 3.3.2.

### 3.3.2 Evaluation Metrics

Data obtained from experiments must be evaluated quantitatively in order to give unbiased results and justify the performance comparison.

Our key concerns are efficiency, quality, robustness towards noise and security. Efficiency can be quantified through the image reconstruction time. Quality of image produced can be evaluated by using root mean square error (RMSE), structural similarity index (SSIM), peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), and correlation coefficient (CC).

In RMSE, mean square error (MSE) is square rooted. MSE is the average difference of pixel between the original image and a processed image. Therefore, RMSE measures the accuracy of the processed image compared to the original image. The equation of RMSE is shown below

$$RMSE = \sum_{i=1}^N \left[ \frac{(z_{fi} - z_{oi})^2}{N} \right]^{0.5} \quad (3.1)$$

where

$z_{fi}$  = processed value

$z_{oi}$  = original value

SSIM is a perceptual metric that measures the deterioration of image from the original image. Similar to RMSE, values of original image and processed image are needed to calculate SSIM. SSIM evaluates the visible structure of the image, and thus are closer to human perception of similarity. The equation of SSIM is shown below

$$SSIM = [l(x, y)^a \cdot c(x, y)^b \cdot s(x, y)^c] \quad (3.2)$$

where

$l(x, y)$  = luminance

$c(x, y)$  = contrast

$s(x, y)$  = structure

$a, b, c$  = weightage of  $l$ ,  $c$  and  $s$  respectively

PSNR represents the ratio of maximum possible power of a signal and the power of noise in the signal. This means that the higher the PSNR, the better reconstructed image is. PSNR is represented in decibels. The equation representing PSNR is shown below.

$$PSNR = 20 \log(MAX_I) - 10 \log(MSE) \quad (3.3)$$

where

$MAX_I$  = maximum value of pixel of the image

CC is a measure of the relationship between two signals. It tries to calculate the probability of linear relationship between two signals. This is metric is not only used in signal processing but also statistics. The equation of CC is shown below

$$CC = \frac{\sum_r \sum_c (A_{rc} - \bar{A})(B_{rc} - \bar{B})}{\sqrt{(\sum_r \sum_c (A_{rc} - \bar{A})^2)(\sum_r \sum_c (B_{rc} - \bar{B})^2)}} \quad (3.4)$$

where

$A, B$  = two different 2D distributions

$r, c$  = indexes of the rows and columns respectively

Next, security measurement metrics are discussed. The methods selected to measure the security of the encryption are histogram analysis, key space analysis, and differential attack analysis. These methods can be visualised and quantified, thus are selected for the security analysis.

Histogram analysis shows the histogram of pixel intensity values. It counts the number of pixels at different intensities that are found in the image. For an 8-bit grayscale image, there are 256 different intensity values. The intensity histogram displays the distribution of pixel intensity in the image based on the 256 intensity values. In a secure encryption, the intensity of the ciphertext should be evenly distributed and different from the histogram of the original image in order to not leak any information to potential attackers (Jiao, et al., 2020). The example the histogram of a secure cryptosystem is shown in Figure 3.3.




Figure 3.3: Histogram of secure cryptosystem: (a)plaintext, (b)ciphertext

Histogram analysis is also quantifiable. This is possible by calculating the variance distribution of the histogram. Small variance means that the histogram is distributed evenly, hence more secure.

Next measurement of security used is the key space analysis. Key space analysis is performed by calculating all the possible set of keys for the encryption. The higher the key space value, the stronger the cryptosystem is against brute force attacks. Key space calculation does not have a specific formula and depends on the cryptosystem itself. For instance, an encryption uses 2 keys and the values of the keys are discrete values that ranges from 1 to 100. Then, the key space of that encryption will be  $100 \times 100 = 10000$ . A cryptosystem needs at least a key space of  $10^{30}$  in order to be considered as robust (Heucheun Yepdia, Tiedeu and Kom, 2021).

The last security measurement method used in this project is the differential attack analysis. Differential attack analysis is done by changing the plaintext slightly and compare its ciphertext with respect to the original plaintext's ciphertext. In a good cryptosystem, the slightest change of plaintext should cause a large change in the ciphertext. There are two metrics that can measure the effect of a slight change of the plaintext over the ciphertext, which are the number of pixel change rate (NPCR) and the unified average change intensity (UACI). The equation of these is shown in Eq. (3.5) and Eq. (3.6) respectively.

$$NPCR = \frac{\sum_{i,j} D(i,j)}{M \times N} \times 100\%, \quad (3.5)$$

where  $D(i,j) = 1$  when  $C(i,j) \neq C'(i,j)$ , else  $D(i,j) = 0$

$$UACI = \frac{1}{M \times N} \left[ \sum_{i,j} \frac{|C(i,j) - C'(i,j)|}{255} \right] \times 100 \quad (3.6)$$



where

$C$  = ciphertext before slight change

$C'$  = ciphertext after slight change

$(i, j)$  = pixel index of the image

$M, N$  = length and width of the image, in pixel count

NPCR measures the rate of change of pixel values in the ciphertext when one pixel of the plaintext is changed. UACI measures the average change of the intensity value of ciphertext when one pixel of plaintext is changed. The expected value of NPCR and UACI are 99.6094070 and 33.463507 respectively (Liu and Ding, 2020). This means that good cryptosystem is expected to have NPCR and UACI that are close to those values.

### 3.4 Proposed New Encryption Method

The proposed new encryption method consists of two encryption process. The first phase encryption is an SPI encoding that utilises a mixed logistic chaotic map as its mask pattern. Second phase of encryption uses either DRPE or RSA encryption. Both of them are tested and compared. The overall flow of the encryption and decryption process is shown in Figure 3.4.




Figure 3.4: Overall flow of encryption and decryption of the proposed system

### 3.4.1 First Phase

The first phase is the SPI encoding phase. The mask patterns used as the key is derived from a bipolar logistic map. Since the logistic map produces values that ranges from 0 to 1, the system is made bipolar by following the condition  $x = 1$  when  $x \geq 0.5$  and  $x = 0$  when  $x < 0.5$ . Two bipolar logistic maps with two different initial condition of size  $M \times N$  is created where  $M$  is the number of sampling measurements and  $N$  is the number of pixels of the image. Next, another bipolar logistic map of length  $M$  is created and is used as a random index map (RIM) to mix the first two logistic map. The first logistic map  $A$  is first chosen as the current map. The first row of the current logistic map is used as the first mask pattern array. The subsequent mask pattern is determined by RIM. If the value of  $RIM = 1$ , it continues to take the next row from the current map. If the value of  $RIM = 0$ , the current map switches to the another logistic map and the rows are taken from it. This process continues for  $M$  iterations. After  $M$  rows are taken, the measurement matrix is completed. Each row of the measurement matrix is the mask pattern. The illustration of the mixing of logistic maps to form the measurement matrix and the flowchart of the mixing algorithm are shown in Figure 3.5 and 3.6 respectively.




Figure 3.5: Mixing process of the logistic map




Figure 3.6: Flowchart of the mixing algorithm

### 3.4.2 Second Phase

The second phase of the encryption either uses DRPE or RSA.

DRPE is reviewed in Section 2.4.1. Let us assume that the result from the first phase encryption is the plaintext here. In this application, the process is done by multiplying the plaintext with a random phase mask  $RP_1$  that is expressed in Eq. (2.7). The size of  $n(x,y)$  in Eq. (2.7) must match the size of the plaintext. After that, the result undergoes a fast Fourier transform (FFT). Next, it is multiplied by a second random phase mask  $RP_2$  that is expressed as in Eq. (2.8). Similarly, the size of  $b(v,\mu)$  must be the same as the size of the plaintext. Finally, it undergoes inverse FFT to get the final ciphertext. For the decryption, the final ciphertext undergoes FFT and then it is multiplied with the conjugate of  $RP_2$ . Next, it undergoes inverse FFT and then the magnitude of the result will be the plaintext. The encryption and decryption process of DRPE is depicted in Figure 3.7.




Figure 3.7: (a)Encryption process of DRPE, (b)Decryption process of DRPE

For RSA encryption, the cryptosystem is initially designed for encrypting strings in ASCII code. Some modifications are needed in order to perform RSA on an image. Note that all the multiplication done here is element wise multiplication.

First, the two initial prime numbers  $p$  and  $q$  are randomly chosen for each pixel of the plaintext (result from first phase encryption). The prime numbers are limited to the 3<sup>rd</sup> prime to the 30<sup>th</sup> prime only and their product,  $n$  must be larger than 255. This is because the calculation of the encryption and decryption of RSA involves getting the remainder when divided by  $n$ . Since image intensity values range from 0 to 255,  $n$  must be at least 256 to obtain the correct reconstructed value will be correct. After the selection of suitable prime numbers, all the needed parameters are calculated for each pixel based on Eq. (2.10), (2.11), and (2.12). The encryption considers complete. The public key, private key and  $n$  for RSA image encryption are expressed as in Eq. (3.7).

$$e = \begin{bmatrix} e_{1,1} & e_{1,2} & \dots \\ e_{2,1} & e_{2,2} & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & e_{i,j} \end{bmatrix}, d = \begin{bmatrix} d_{1,1} & d_{1,2} & \dots \\ d_{2,1} & d_{2,2} & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & d_{i,j} \end{bmatrix}, n = \begin{bmatrix} n_{1,1} & n_{1,2} & \dots \\ n_{2,1} & n_{2,2} & \dots \\ \dots & \dots & n_{i,j} \end{bmatrix} \quad (3.7)$$

where

$e$  = public key

$d$  = private key

$n$  = modulus

$i, j$  = plaintext size in pixel

The encryption and decryption are done by following Eq. (2.13) and (2.14) for each of the pixel of the plaintext. Before encryption, the result from the first phase encryption needs to be converted from 0-1 to 0-255. This is done by multiplying it by 255 and obtaining the integer part. Its decimal part is recorded into an array. The array is added after the decryption process to prevent information loss. The final ciphertext are expressed as grayscale intensities. Since the encryption process may produce ciphertext that are more than 255, some modifications need to be done in order to keep the ciphertext below 256 without information loss. This is done by utilising Eq. (3.8)

$$c = 256k + r \quad (3.8)$$

where

$c$  = original ciphertext

$k$  = multiple constant

$r$  = remainder

The remainder will be used as the final result of the encryption. Eq. (3.8) is used to retrieve the original ciphertext without losing any information. Due to this,  $c$  and  $k$  need to be passed along with the decryption key  $d$  in order to decrypt  $r$ .

### 3.5 Project Planning

The project planning is done by creating a Gantt chart shown in Figure 3.8 to ensure that important milestones are achieved in time so that good results can be produced in time. The Gantt chart shows the time allocated for each important milestone throughout the 14 week time span.

ACTIVITY	PLAN START	PLAN DURATION (Weeks)	PLAN END	Jan														
				W1	W2	W3	W4	W5	W6	W7	W8	W9	W10	W11	W12	W13	W14	
Recap on SPI and DRPE	W1	2	W2	█	█													
Writing SPI simulation on MATLAB	W2	3	W4		█	█	█											
Research on security evaluation method	W4	4	W7				█	█	█	█								
Research on chaotic maps	W6	4	W9					█	█	█	█							
Formulating first phase encryption	W8	3	W10							█	█	█						
Research on RSA	W9	3	W11								█	█	█					
Formulating second phase encryption	W10	3	W12									█	█	█				
Writing security evaluation into MATLAB code	W11	2	W12										█	█				
Tabulating all data into excel and making charts	W12	2	W13											█	█			
Writing report	W13	2	W14													█	█	
Final presentation	W14	1	W14															█

Figure 3.8: Gantt chart

### 3.6 Summary

The process flow of SPI encoding methods such as Hadamard, random, Fourier, and logistic chaotic is presented. The newly proposed encryption method is also explained in detail. The new encryption method is a double encryption which utilises SPI at the first phase and DRPE or RSA at the second phase. For the first phase, the mixing of logistic maps with RIM as the measurement matrix of the SPI is the modification to improve the encoding security. In the second phase, DRPE or RSA is used. For RSA which is initially designed for encrypting strings in ASCII code, it is modified to suit image encryption. Overall performance will be evaluated using CC,

RMSE, PSNR, and SSIM in term of image quality. Meanwhile histogram analysis, key space analysis, and differential attack analysis will be performed to evaluate its security capability. The Gantt chart is also made to plan work ahead of time.

## CHAPTER 4

### RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS

#### 4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, the results of the simulation of different SPI encoding methods will be presented and discussed. The SPI encoding methods will be evaluated based on its reconstruction quality and security. The advantage of each method will be examined. After that, the results of the proposed method will be presented and reviewed. Since there are two different encryption method in the second phase, the performance based on quality and security will be compared and discussed. Issues presented by the method will also be assessed. Finally, the proposed method will be compared with the of the conventional SPI encoding methods in order to visualise and discuss the advantages and potential drawbacks of the proposed methods.

#### 4.2 Comparisons Between Present Methods

Methods that are compared are Hadamard, random, Fourier and chaotic logistic. The results of the reconstruction for image A, 0, 7, and cameraman are shown in Table 4.1, 4.2, 4.3, and 4.4 respectively. Via visual observation of the reconstructed images, we can see that the image reconstruction quality becomes better as the sampling ratio increases. This is because there is more information that are available to reconstruct the image. All images are still recognisable at all sampling ratio. It is notable that the Hadamard method has the worst reconstruction quality at sampling ratio of 1. It is also noticeable that the Fourier method has the best reconstruction quality at lower sampling ratio. All of these observations are only based on visual inspection and will be further verified by using the proper quality measurement methods.



Table 4.1: Reconstruction results for image A


















Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Hadamard)				
Reconstructed image (Random)				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				
Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				

Table 4.2: Reconstruction results for image 0


















Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Hadamard)				
Reconstructed image (Random)				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				
Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				

Table 4.3: Reconstruction results for image 7



































Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Hadamard)				
Reconstructed image (Random)				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				
Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				

Table 4.4: Reconstruction results for image cameraman

Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Hadamard)				
Reconstructed image (Random)				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				
Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				

#### 4.2.1 Reconstruction Quality

In this section, the reconstruction quality of the studied methods is discussed by using RMSE, PSNR, SSIM, and CC. The data is tabulated in Table 4.5 for all measuring metrics for different sampling ratio.

Table 4.5: Tabulated reconstruction quality metrics for different SPI encoding schemes

Method	Image	M/N	RMSE	PSNR	SSIM	CC
Hadamard	A	1	0.10781	19.347	0.3739	0.84816
		0.75	0.13834	17.181	0.31773	0.801
		0.5	0.22272	13.045	0.25882	0.66705
		0.25	0.30048	10.444	0.18743	0.50954
	0	1	0.35003	9.1178	0.18247	0.74565
		0.75	0.35575	8.9771	0.15967	0.68542
		0.5	0.43398	7.2507	0.13348	0.58513
		0.25	0.43745	0.71814	0.082424	0.45747
	7	1	0.34052	9.3573	0.15393	0.75023
		0.75	0.31519	10.029	0.12889	0.69167
		0.5	0.37772	8.4566	0.10867	0.6274
		0.25	0.47769	6.4171	0.090723	0.47802
	cameraman	1	0.21778	13.239	0.43648	0.85303
		0.75	0.21004	13.554	0.39565	0.78479
		0.5	0.21974	13.162	0.35618	0.6789
		0.25	0.19836	14.051	0.3	0.5858
Method	Image	M/N	RMSE	PSNR	SSIM	CC
random	A	1	0.060912	24.306	0.89809	0.99987
		0.75	0.10662	19.443	0.33747	0.84129
		0.5	0.17773	15.005	0.22867	0.6948
		0.25	0.26677	11.477	0.15214	0.50325
	0	1	0.075699	22.418	0.31885	0.99995
		0.75	0.33858	9.4068	0.15742	0.82113
		0.5	0.39093	8.158	0.11679	0.6515
		0.25	0.44904	6.9543	0.078919	0.46348
	7	1	0.079563	21.986	0.26204	0.99995
		0.75	0.29743	10.532	0.153	0.80839
		0.5	0.37138	8.6037	0.115	0.64459
		0.25	0.43028	7.325	0.078264	0.44939
	cameraman	1	0.028755	30.826	0.99075	0.99985
		0.75	0.15753	16.053	0.36772	0.85763
		0.5	0.18631	14.595	0.26721	0.70891
		0.25	0.21413	13.386	0.17599	0.50224
Method	Image	M/N	RMSE	PSNR	SSIM	CC
Fourier	A	1	0.065313	23.7	0.88235	0.99998
		0.75	0.031104	30.144	0.78243	0.97578
		0.5	0.04528	26.882	0.64543	0.94977
		0.25	0.087619	21.148	0.45295	0.81109
	0	1	0.074616	22.543	0.31981	1
		0.75	0.14613	16.705	0.27547	0.98785
		0.5	0.16697	15.547	0.25987	0.97421
		0.25	0.27096	11.342	0.20241	0.92225

	7	1	0.076676	22.307	0.26425	1
		0.75	0.12369	18.153	0.23551	0.99038
		0.5	0.16445	15.679	0.21487	0.97697
		0.25	0.23953	12.413	0.17501	0.94022
	cameraman	1	0.024467	32.228	0.99688	0.99998
		0.75	0.094526	20.489	0.73102	0.98608
		0.5	0.14614	16.705	0.57709	0.96603
		0.25	0.21395	13.394	0.4046	0.91632
Method	Image	M/N	RMSE	PSNR	SSIM	CC
Chaotic logistic	A	1	0.064677	23.785	0.87992	0.99974
		0.75	0.12777	17.872	0.29166	0.77607
		0.5	0.21606	13.308	0.18746	0.56623
		0.25	0.2717	11.318	0.10996	0.36424
	0	1	0.080016	21.936	0.31548	0.99988
		0.75	0.35836	8.9136	0.14158	0.72006
		0.5	0.45584	6.8237	0.096935	0.50814
		0.25	0.4596	6.7524	0.056585	0.31911
	7	1	0.080415	21.893	0.26118	0.99983
		0.75	0.37708	8.4713	0.11729	0.70163
		0.5	0.43974	7.1362	0.085395	0.49758
		0.25	0.53995	5.3529	0.04589	0.3181
	cameraman	1	0.031873	29.932	0.98816	0.99973
		0.75	0.1543	16.233	0.32587	0.77657
		0.5	0.19574	14.166	0.22396	0.56164
		0.25	0.22	13.152	0.15883	0.35995

Figure 4.1 shows the average RMSE for all encoding methods at different sampling ratio. RMSE for all measuring methods are decreasing when sampling rate is increased. This is expected as the accuracy of the reconstruction should be increased when the sampling rate is increased. Ideally, RMSE should be as low as possible. Based on Figure 4.1, random and chaotic logistic encoding method have comparable RMSE performance at all sampling rates while Hadamard method has the worst result especially at the sampling ratio of 1. The best performing encoding method is the Fourier method as it has a low RMSE at low sampling rate.




Figure 4.1: Average RMSE of all reconstructed images at different sampling ratio

Figure 4.2 shows the average PSNR for all encoding methods at different sampling ratio. The higher the PSNR, the better the reconstruction image is. In terms of PSNR, the performance has a similar trend as RMSE where random and chaotic logistic method has average performance, Fourier method has the best performance while Hadamard method has the worst performance.




Figure 4.2: Average PSNR of all reconstructed images at different sampling ratio

Figure 4.3 shows the average SSIM for all encoding methods at different sampling ratio. SSIM is a perceptual metric that measures the structural similarity of the image with respect to the original image. SSIM ranges from 0 to 1, with 1 being

the ideal value. The trend of the quality of the reconstructed image is similar to the ones for RMSE and PSNR. The SSIM of Hadamard method is very low across all sampling ratio, and performs the worst in this metric.




Figure 4.3: Average SSIM of all reconstructed images at different sampling ratio

Figure 4.3 shows the average CC for all encoding methods at different sampling ratio. CC measures the relationship between two images. Value of CC ranges from 0 to 1 where 1 is the best. Fourier performs the best at all sampling ratio in this metric. The second-best performing encoding method is the random method. Overall, chaotic logistic method has better CC than Hadamard method. However, Hadamard method outperforms the chaotic logistic method at lower sampling ratios, and even outperform the random method at sampling ratio of 0.25. The Hadamard method has better performance when measured in this metric when compared with RMSE, PSNR, and SSIM.






Figure 4.4: Average CC of all reconstructed images at different sampling ratio

After going through all the performance metrics for the encoding methods, Fourier method has the best overall performance, followed by random method and chaotic logistic method. The clear worst performer is the Hadamard method. This is consistent with the result of the visual evaluation done in section 4.2. However, do note that the performance of random and chaotic logistic method may fluctuate a little depending on the seed used.

#### 4.2.2 Security

The security tests done in this project are the histogram analysis, key space analysis, and differential attack analysis. The security measurement metric values of all encoding methods studied are tabulated in Table 4.6. The security is measured for sampling ratio of 1 only because different sampling ratio is insignificant to the security measurements metrics as the results are similar.

Table 4.6: Security measurement metric values of all encoding methods

Method	Image	M/N	Histogram variance	NPCR	UACI	Key space
Hadamard	A	1	$5.96 \times 10^4$	1.269531	0.004979	$4096^{4096}$
	0		$5.30 \times 10^4$	1.953125	0.007659	
	7		$5.47 \times 10^4$	1.733398	0.006798	
	cameraman		$4.31 \times 10^4$	3.466797	0.013595	
random	A	1	$3.65 \times 10^4$	2.246094	0.008808	$2^{4096 \times 4096}$
	0		$2.35 \times 10^4$	3.369141	0.013212	
	7		$2.87 \times 10^4$	2.758789	0.010819	
	cameraman		$1.71 \times 10^4$	0.976563	0.00383	
Fourier	A	1	$5.93 \times 10^4$	0.90332	0.003542	1
	0		$5.37 \times 10^4$	2.001953	0.007851	
	7		$5.55 \times 10^4$	1.464844	0.005744	
	cameraman		$4.09 \times 10^4$	3.515625	0.013787	
chaotic	A	1	$5.52 \times 10^4$	2.978516	0.01168	$3 \times 10^{31}$
	0		$4.32 \times 10^4$	4.125977	0.018095	
	7		$4.58 \times 10^4$	4.614258	0.018095	
	cameraman		$2.93 \times 10^4$	2.001953	0.007851	

First, results of histogram analysis will be evaluated. As observed from the histograms in Figure 4.5, 4.6, 4.7, and 4.8, the ciphertext has intensity that is concentrated on a certain value. Besides that, the concentration tends to follow a similar pattern as the plaintext. The variance of all the histograms is in the order of  $10^4$ , which indicates that the histogram is very concentrated around a few values only. This shows the weakness in the security of SPI encoding as attacker can get clues on the key and plaintext based on the concentrated values. The ideal histogram is evenly distributed and different from the histogram of the plaintext. None of these methods on any images provides a safe encryption in terms of histogram analysis. The purpose of proposing a new method is to solve this problem.




Figure 4.5: Histogram of ciphertext and plaintext when using Hadamard method for image: (a) A, (b) 0, (c) 7, (d) cameraman




Figure 4.6: Histogram of ciphertext and plaintext when using random method for image: (a) A, (b) 0, (c) 7, (d) cameraman




Figure 4.7: Histogram of ciphertext and plaintext when using Fourier method for image: (a) A, (b) 0, (c) 7, (d) cameraman




Figure 4.8: Histogram of ciphertext and plaintext when using chaotic logistic method for image: (a) A, (b) 0, (c) 7, (d) cameraman

Next, the results of differential attack analysis are discussed. For the encryption to be good against differential attack, its NPCR and UACI should be close to 99.6094070 and 33.463507 respectively (Liu and Ding, 2020). Based on Table 4.6, all the methods on all images produces NPCR and UACI values that are very low and far from the ideal value. This low value indicates that when the plaintext is changed slightly, the ciphertext will only have a very slight change. This is a bad situation for security as attackers can accumulate clues after many iterations.

Now, the key space analysis will be discussed. Key space of an encoding method is the same for all images. The calculation of key space will depend on the encoding method. For the Hadamard method, since  $M$  Hadamard masks is arranged randomly, the key space will be  $M^M$ , where  $M$  is the number of sampling measurements. In this project, number of pixels  $N$  is set to 4096, thus the key space for Hadamard method for sampling ratio of 1 is  $4096^{4096}$ . Next, key space calculation for random method is evaluated. Since values in the measurement matrix are bipolar and there are  $M \times N$  number of elements, the key space for random method when the

sampling ratio is 1 is  $2^{4096 \times 4096}$ . Next, the key space for Fourier method is only one since the Fourier map is used as it is for the encoding. For chaotic logistic method, there are two element that dictates the map, which is the initial condition that ranges from 0 to 1 and the growth rate that ranges from 3.7 to 4. Assuming the computer has a precision of  $10^{-16}$ , the key space will be  $10^{16} \times 10^{16} \times 0.3 = 3 \times 10^{31}$ .

The size of key space for all encoding methods except Fourier method meets the minimum size to be considered robust which is  $10^{30}$ . The key space of Hadamard and random method may seem extremely large but in reality, it is actually smaller. The calculation assumes that random number generation in MATLAB is truly random when in reality it is not. The random number generation in MATLAB is pseudorandom and depend on some algorithm and seed which has smaller key space than the key space calculated here.

In summary, the security of available SPI encoding method is not enough as there are some drawbacks such as concentrated histogram and vulnerable to differential attack.

### **4.3 Comparisons Between Proposed Method**

Two methods have been proposed to improve the security of the SPI encoding scheme. They are the mixed logistic map SPI-DRPE and mixed logistic map SPI-RSA. They will be mentioned as SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA in this section. Their reconstruction quality and security will be compared.

#### **4.3.1 Reconstruction Quality**

Table 4.7 shows the tabulated reconstruction quality measurement metrics for all tested images. From Table 4.7, we can observe that the value of all the quality measurement metrics is the same for all the images and sampling ratios. This is because the second phase encryption, DRPE and RSA returns perfect results when decryption is done. Thus, the part that is actually evaluated is the first phase encryption, which is the same for both methods.

Table 4.7: Quality metrics for SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA

Method	Image	M/N	RMSE	PSNR	SSIM	CC
SPI-DRPE	A	1	0.061144	24.273	0.89434	0.99971
		0.75	0.18623	14.599	0.27264	0.76519
		0.5	0.24394	12.254	0.17833	0.58183
		0.25	0.27833	11.109	0.11665	0.37295
	0	1	0.074794	22.523	0.31931	0.99987
		0.75	0.36545	8.7434	0.14003	0.71758
		0.5	0.43895	7.1517	0.10301	0.51739
		0.25	0.48464	6.2916	0.060181	0.3323
	7	1	0.078934	22.055	0.26218	0.99983
		0.75	0.37735	8.4651	0.11591	0.7124
		0.5	0.39017	8.175	0.081261	0.50318
		0.25	0.52503	5.5963	0.043772	0.29502
	cameraman	1	0.030737	30.247	0.98832	0.99974
		0.75	0.16091	15.868	0.33319	0.77954
		0.5	0.19661	14.128	0.23415	0.57045
		0.25	0.25633	11.824	0.16569	0.35731
SPI-RSA	A	1	0.061144	24.273	0.89434	0.99971
		0.75	0.18623	14.599	0.27264	0.76519
		0.5	0.24394	12.254	0.17833	0.58183
		0.25	0.27833	11.109	0.11665	0.37295
	0	1	0.074794	22.523	0.31931	0.99987
		0.75	0.36545	8.7434	0.14003	0.71758
		0.5	0.43895	7.1517	0.10301	0.51739
		0.25	0.48464	6.2916	0.060181	0.3323
	7	1	0.078934	22.055	0.26218	0.99983
		0.75	0.37735	8.4651	0.11591	0.7124
		0.5	0.39017	8.175	0.081261	0.50318
		0.25	0.52503	5.5963	0.043772	0.29502
	cameraman	1	0.030737	30.247	0.98832	0.99974
		0.75	0.16091	15.868	0.33319	0.77954
		0.5	0.19661	14.128	0.23415	0.57045
		0.25	0.25633	11.824	0.16569	0.35731

### 4.3.2 Security

The security analysis done are the histogram analysis, differential attack analysis, and key space analysis. The security analysis is done only for sampling ratio of 1 because the security analysis for different sampling ratio is redundant.



Table 4.8: Results of security analysis

Method	Image	M/N	Histogram variance	NPCR	UACI	Key space
SPI-DRPE	A	1	8.97E+02	3.686523	0.014457	$2.7 \times 10^{94}$ (first phase), $(4096^{10^{16}})^2$ (second phase)
	0		1.17E+03	3.735352	0.014648	
	7		1.79E+03	3.881836	0.015223	
	cameraman		2.40E+02	1.318359	0.00517	
SPI-RSA	A	1	1.40E+02	100	47.10445	$2.7 \times 10^{94}$ (first phase)
	0		1.23E+02	100	47.89199	
	7		1.77E+02	100	48.69221	
	cameraman		1.29E+02	100	47.35618	

First, histogram analysis is discussed. Figure 4.9 and 4.10 shows the histogram of the final ciphertext and plaintext of all images for SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA respectively at sampling ratio of 1. For SPI-DRPE, it is observed that the histogram of final ciphertext is slightly spread out compared to the histogram of conventional SPI encoding. However, it still slightly resembles the original image histogram and is still too focused on one spot. The average variance of the histogram is still high with a value of 1030. For SPI-RSA, the histograms of the final ciphertext are spread out over the intensity spectrum. Although the histograms do not appear uniform, they do not resemble the original image histogram. The average variance of the histogram is 140 which is low compared to SPI-DRPE. This means that the histogram of SPI-RSA is more spread out compared to SPI-DRPE. Therefore, SPI-RSA is more secure compared to SPI-DRPE when analysed with histogram as it is harder to derive any clues from the histogram of SPI-RSA compared with SPI-DRPE.




Figure 4.9: Histogram of final ciphertext and plaintext when using SPI-DRPE method for image: (a) A, (b) 0, (c) 7, (d) cameraman




Figure 4.10: Histogram of final ciphertext and plaintext when using SPI-RSA method for image: (a) A, (b) 0, (c) 7, (d) cameraman

Next, differential attack analysis is discussed. For the encryption to be good against differential attack, its NPCR and UACI should be close to 99.6094070 and 33.463507 respectively (Liu and Ding, 2020). Higher value of NPCR and UACI is better. Based on Table 4.8, the NPCR and UACI of SPI-DRPE is still low and not close to the ideal value. This means that there is only a little change in the final ciphertext when one pixel of plaintext is altered. On the other hand, SPI-RSA boasts an average NPCR and UACI of 100 and 47.8 respectively. They are closer to the ideal value and higher. NPCR of 100 means that all the pixels in the final ciphertext will change when one pixel of the plaintext is altered. Thus, SPI-RSA is very resistant to differential attack, unlike its SPI-DRPE counterpart.






Finally, the key space analysis is discussed. Assume the precision of the computer is up to  $10^{-16}$ . For the first phase encryption, the key space is calculated as  $(10^{16} \times 10^{16} \times 0.3)^3 = 2.7 \times 10^{94}$ . The calculation is done so because there are three logistic maps used in this encryption and the key space of one logistic map is  $10^{16} \times 10^{16} \times 0.3$ . The key space of the second phase encryption for SPI-DRPE at

the sampling ratio of 1 is calculated as  $(4096^{10^{16}})^2$ . This is because there are 2 random number arrays created to form  $RP_1$  and  $RP_2$ , and the random number ranges from 0 to 1 with precision assumed to be  $10^{-16}$ . 4096 is the number of pixels of the first ciphertext when sampling ratio is 1. The key space of the second phase encryption for SPI-RSA is hard to find because the key space of asymmetric cryptosystem is less studied, thus it is not discussed here. The total key space of the proposed systems is found by adding phase 1 and phase 2 key space. The phase 2 key space of DRPE is extremely large, though in reality it is smaller due to the random number generator being not truly random. The key space of the first phase alone is  $2.7 \times 10^{94}$  which is much larger than  $10^{30}$ . This makes both proposed method a robust encryption method against brute force attacks.

#### 4.4 Overall Comparisons

The proposed methods are compared with the conventional SPI encoding methods. The SPI encoding method chosen to be compared with the proposed methods are the chaotic logistic method and Fourier method. Chaotic logistic method is chosen because the first phase of the proposed methods is derived from the logistic map. Fourier method is chosen because it has the best quality performance out of all of the studied SPI encoding methods. First, visual evaluation is done based on Table 4.9, 4.10, 4.11, and 4.12.

Table 4.9: Reconstructed images for image A

Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				









Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				
Reconstructed image (SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA)				

Table 4.10: Reconstructed images for image 0













Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				
Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				
Reconstructed image (SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA)				

Table 4.11: Reconstructed images for image 7




















Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				
Reconstructed image (Chaotic logistic)				
Reconstructed image (SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA)				

Table 4.12: Reconstructed images for image cameraman

Sampling ratio (M/N)	0.25	0.5	0.75	1
Original image				
Reconstructed image (Fourier)				



The method that produces the reconstruction quality visually is the Fourier method. The proposed methods and the chaotic logistic method look extremely similar.

Next, we will evaluate the quality quantitatively. The average RMSE, PSNR, SSIM, and CC for the studied methods are plotted against the sampling ratio in Figure 4.11, 4.12, 4.13, and 4.14. The quality evaluation metrics shows an improving trend when sampling ratio is increased. The Fourier method reigns superior in terms of reconstruction quality for all metrics at low sampling rate. Chaotic logistic method has similar quality performance across the board with the proposed methods. This trend matches the visual evaluation.




Figure 4.11: Average RMSE for different sampling ratio




Figure 4.12: Average PSNR for different sampling ratio




Figure 4.13: Average SSIM for different sampling ratio






Figure 4.14: Average CC for different sampling ratio

In terms of security, the SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA has larger key spaces compared to Fourier and chaotic logistic method. Thus, they are more resistant to brute force attacks. For histogram analysis, SPI-RSA has by far the best histogram which is very spread out and has the lowest variance. It also looks totally different compared to the histogram of the plaintext. SPI-DRPE has slightly better histogram than the other two methods since the results is slightly spread out and its variance is lower. In terms of differential attack analysis, SPI-RSA is by far the strongest against differential attack due to its superb NPCR and UACI which is high and close to the ideal value.

#### 4.5 Summary

This chapter discussed the comparison between the conventional SPI encoding methods in terms of quality and security. It is found that Fourier method has best quality performance overall and Hadamard method has the worst. In terms of security, all of the conventional SPI encoding methods have sufficient key space to resist brute force attacks, but are very weak when evaluated with histogram analysis and differential attack analysis. Their ciphertext gives away information to the attacker.

For the proposed methods, both SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA has the same image reconstruction quality. The quality evaluation shows that it has extremely similar performance as the chaotic logistic method, which is average. In terms of security,

SPI-RSA is the best with good histogram spread that does not give away information, lowest histogram variance, great resistance against differential attack and very good resistance against brute force attack. SPI-DRPE method is inferior in every way when compared with SPI-RSA except the key space. Its security is a slight improvement compared with the conventional SPI encoding methods in this study. Thus, SPI-RSA is a very good foundation for better SPI based encryption framework.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### 5.1 Conclusions

In this project, many SPI and non-SPI encoding and decoding schemes are reviewed. The reviewed SPI encoding and decoding strengthened the foundation in order to develop a better encoding scheme. The analysis of DRPE and RSA encryption framework have helped in developing the proposed SPI based encryption method that are more secure.

A novel encryption method based on SPI is successfully developed and have overcome the security problems of SPI encoding using the knowledge of DRPE, RSA and chaotic theory.

Besides, the performance of the designed method and available SPI based encoding method are evaluated based on its quality and security using quantifiable metrics. The designed method is also compared with the available SPI encoding method. Through the comparisons, the strengths and weaknesses of the proposed method are found. It is found that the proposed mixed logistic map SPI-RSA has greatly improved the security of the SPI encoding method.

#### 5.2 Recommendations for future work

The proposed methods, namely mixed logistic map SPI-DRPE and SPI-RSA encryption framework can be further improved, especially the SPI-DRPE method. For instance, the first ciphertext can be padded in order to get a more uniform histogram distribution.

Since this project is done through simulation using MATLAB, it is hoped that this project can be done physically so that the implication of real-world conditions such as noise on the proposed methods can be studied. One of the suggestions is that a DMD can be used as the light pattern modulator of the SPI setup.

The encryption and decryption time analysis of the proposed methods can be done in the future as time is a very important factor when encryption and decryption need to be done in real time. However, there is a limitation on the proposed method in terms of encryption and decryption time. Since the proposed method is a double

encryption, two encryption processes need to be done in order to encrypt an image. This will usually take more time compared to a conventional SPI encoding method that only encodes the image one time only. A smarter approach is needed in order to reduce or fully overcome this limitation.

It is hoped that the proposed mixed logistic map SPI-RSA can be a starting point in inspiring the development of more secure and robust SPI based encoding methods.

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## APPENDICES

### APPENDIX A: Simulation codes

#### singlepix\_hadamard.m

```

clear all
addpath(genpath('l1magic'))

% Simulation using test image
image = rgb2gray(im2double(imread('38.png')));
%image = im2double(imread('cameraman.tif'));

res = 64; %set resolution
N = res^2; %number of pixels = res^2
M = 1*N; %number of sampling measurements
phi = zeros(M,N); %phi = measurement matrix A
y = zeros(M,1);

image = imresize(image, [res,res]); %resize image to
the mask resolution

%create M res x res hadamard masks by reformatting
each row of the hadamard matrix
h = hadamard(N);
h(h==-1) = 0;
rng(1);
randvec = randi([1 N],N,1); % random vector with
elements 1 to N, used to reorder the hadamard
patterns

%find y
startmask = tic; %start stopwatch
for ip = 1:M
    %save hadamard mask pattern into measurement
matrix phi
    i = randvec(ip); % randomly picks a value from
randvec
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(h(i,:),res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);
    phi(ip,:) = h(i,:);

    %reshape each hadamard mask to the size of the
image
    %hsamp = imresize(mask,size(image),'nearest');

```



```

hsamp = mask;

%project pattern sequence to image
temp = image;
temp(hsamp==0) = 0;

%record average intensity
y(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
endmask = toc(startmask); %stop stopwatch and record
the reading time

%solve and reconstruct image
% Find x, image representation --> estIm
% y = Ax
% x = A-1*y = A\y --> inverse A
% Note: x = img0/estIm (Nx1), A = phi (MxN), y =
aver (Mx1)
startrecon = tic; %start stopwatch
invphi = pinv(phi);%pinv(A) returns the Moore-
Penrose Pseudoinverse of matrix A.
im0 = invphi*y;%initial solution, im0 = x, y = phi*x,
x = (phi^-1)*y
estIm = lldantzig_pd(im0, phi, [], y, 0.01, 1e-4,2);

% Reconstruct image
reconIm = vec2mat(estIm,res);
reconIm = (reconIm-
min(min(reconIm)))/(max(max(reconIm))-
min(min(reconIm)));%normalize image

endrecon = toc(startrecon); %end stopwatch and
record reconstruction time

%calculate RMSE
A = zeros(res,res);
scaled_image = imresize(image,size(A));
o = vec2mat(scaled_image,1);
o_un = vec2mat(reconIm,1);
for i = 1:N
    diff = (o_un(i,1) - o(i,1));
    diff_sq(i,:) = diff^2;
end
diff_sq_sum = sum(diff_sq,1);
RMSE = sqrt(diff_sq_sum/N);

%calculate PSNR

```

```

peaksnr = psnr(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate SSIM
ssimval = ssim(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate CC
ccval = corr2(scaled_image, reconIm);

%calculate M/N
MNratio = M/N;

%show the rescaled image
figure;
subplot(1,2,1); imshow(scaled_image);
title('Rescaled image');

%show the reconstructed image
subplot(1,2,2); imshow(reconIm);
title(['Reconstructed image']);

%Security analysis
%histogram analysis
figure; subplot(1,2,1);
imhist(y); title('histogram of y');
[ycounts, ybinLocations] = imhist(y);
subplot(1,2,2);
imhist(scaled_image); title('histogram of image');
[imcounts, imbinLocations] = imhist(scaled_image);%
title('histogram of image');

%image entropy
y_entropy = entropy(y);

%histogram variance
imdata=reshape(transpose(scaled_image),1,[]);
v = var(ycounts);
vim = var(imcounts);

%differential attack analysis: NPCR & UACI
img_chg = image;
img_chg(1,1) = 1;
y_chg = zeros(M,1);
for ip = 1:M
    mask = H(:, :, ip);

    hsamp = mask;

```

```

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = img_chg;
    temp(hsamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y_chg(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
y = round(255.*y);
y_chg = round(255.*y_chg);
D = 0;
diffsum = 0;
for i=1:M
    if(y(i)~=y_chg(i))
        D = D + 1;
    end
    diffsum = diffsum + abs(y(i) - y_chg(i))/255;
end
NPCR = (D/M)*100;
UACI = 100*diffsum/M;

%tabulate results
T = table(MNratio, RMSE, peaksnr, ssimval, ccval,
endmask, endrecon);
disp(T);

```

### singlepix\_random.m

```

clear all
addpath(genpath('llmagic'))

% Simulation using test image
image = rgb2gray(im2double(imread('192.png')));
%image = im2double(imread('A.png'));

res = 64; %set resolution
N = res^2; %number of pixels = res^2
M = 1*N; %number of sampling measurements
phi = zeros(M,N); %phi = measurement matrix A
y = zeros(M,1);

image = imresize(image, [res,res]); %resize image to
the mask resolution

% Find y, measurement --> average intensity
startmask = tic; %start stopwatch
for ip = 1:M

```

```

rng(ip); %fix the random seed
randp = randi([0 1],res); %binary pattern generated
(sqrt(N)*sqrt(N))
%randsamp =
imresize(randp,size(image),'nearest'); %resize
pattern to image resolution
randsamp = randp;

phi(ip,:) = randp(:)';%save pattern (sqrt(N)*sqrt(N))
into sampling matrix (MxN)

%project pattern sequence to image (keep only
datapoints from on pixels)
temp = image;
temp(randsamp==0) = 0;

%get average intensity
y(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
endmask = toc(startmask); %stop stopwatch and record
the reading time

%solve and reconstruct image
% Find x, image representation --> estIm
% y = Ax
% x = A^-1*y = A\y --> inverse A
% Note: x = img0/estIm (Nx1), A = phi (MxN), y =
aver (Mx1)
startrecon = tic; %start stopwatch
invphi = pinv(phi);%pinv(A) returns the Moore-
Penrose Pseudoinverse of matrix A.
im0 = invphi*y;%initial solution, im0 = x, y = phi*x,
x = (phi^-1)*y
estIm = lldantzig_pd(im0, phi, [], y, 0.01, 1e-4,2);

% Reconstruct image
reconIm = reshape(estIm,res,res);
reconIm = (reconIm-
min(min(reconIm)))/(max(max(reconIm))-
min(min(reconIm)));%normalize image

endrecon = toc(startrecon); %end stopwatch and
record reconstruction time

%calculate RMSE
A = zeros(res,res);
scaled_image = imresize(image,size(A));

```

```

o = vec2mat(scaled_image,1);
o_un = vec2mat(reconIm,1);
for i = 1:N
    diff = (o_un(i,1) - o(i,1));
    diff_sq(i,:) = diff^2;
end
diff_sq_sum = sum(diff_sq,1);
RMSE = sqrt(diff_sq_sum/N);

%calculate PSNR
peaksnr = psnr(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate SSIM
ssimval = ssim(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate CC
ccval = corr2(scaled_image, reconIm);

%calculate M/N
MNratio = M/N;

y_entropy = entropy(y);

%show the rescaled image
figure;
subplot(1,2,1); imshow(scaled_image);
title('Rescaled image');

%show the reconstructed image
subplot(1,2,2); imshow(reconIm);
title(['Reconstructed image']);

%Security analysis
%histogram analysis
figure; subplot(1,2,1);
imhist(y); title('histogram of y');
[ycounts, ybinLocations] = imhist(y);
subplot(1,2,2);
imhist(scaled_image); title('histogram of image');
[imcounts, imbinLocations] = imhist(scaled_image);%
title('histogram of image');

%image entropy
y_entropy = entropy(y);

%histogram variance
imdata=reshape(transpose(scaled_image),1,[]);

```

```

v = var(ycounts);
vim = var(imcounts);

%differential attack analysis: NPCR & UACI
img_chg = image;
img_chg(1,1) = 1;
y_chg = zeros(M,1);
for ip = 1:M
    rng(ip); %fix the random seed
    mask = randi([0 1],res);

    randsamp = mask;

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = img_chg;
    temp(randsamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y_chg(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
y = round(255.*y);
y_chg = round(255.*y_chg);
D = 0;
diffsum = 0;
for i=1:M
    if(y(i)~=y_chg(i))
        D = D + 1;
    end
    diffsum = diffsum + abs(y(i) - y_chg(i))/255;
end
NPCR = (D/M)*100;
UACI = 100*diffsum/M;

%tabulate results
T = table(MNratio, RMSE, peaksnr, ssimval, ccval,
endmask, endrecon);
disp(T);

```

### singlepix\_fourier.m

```

clear all
addpath(genpath('llmagic'))

% Simulation using test image
%image = rgb2gray(im2double(imread('192.png')));
image = im2double(imread('cameraman.tif'));

```

```

res = 64; %set resolution
N = res^2; %number of pixels = res^2
M = 1*N; %number of sampling measurements
phi = zeros(M,N); %phi = measurement matrix A
y = zeros(M,1);

image = imresize(image, [res,res]); %resize image to
the mask resolution

%create N res x res Fourier masks by reformatting
each row of the DCT matrix
dct = dctmtx(N);
dct(dct<=0)=0;
dct(dct>0)=1;

%find y
startmask = tic; %start stopwatch
for ip = 1:M
    %save Fourier mask pattern into measurement
matrix phi
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(dct(ip,:),res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);
    phi(ip,:) = dct(ip,:);

    %reshape each Fourier mask to the size of the
image
    %dctsamp = imresize(mask,size(image),'nearest');
    dctsamp = mask;

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = image;
    temp(dctsamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
endmask = toc(startmask); %stop stopwatch and record
the reading time
%y = round(255.*y)./255;

%solve and reconstruct image
% Find x, image representation --> estIm
% y = Ax
% x = A^-1*y = A\y --> inverse A
% Note: x = img0/estIm (Nx1), A = phi (MxN), y =
aver (Mx1)
startrecon = tic; %start stopwatch

```

```

invphi = pinv(phi);%pinv(A) returns the Moore-
Penrose Pseudoinverse of matrix A.
im0 = invphi*y;%initial solution
estIm = lldantzig_pd(im0, phi, [], y, 0.01, 1e-4,2);

% Reconstruct image
reconIm = vec2mat(estIm,res);
reconIm = (reconIm-
min(min(reconIm)))/(max(max(reconIm))-
min(min(reconIm)));%normalize image

endrecon = toc(startrecon); %end stopwatch and
record reconstruction time

%calculate RMSE
A = zeros(res,res);
scaled_image = imresize(image,size(A));
o = vec2mat(scaled_image,1);
o_un = vec2mat(reconIm,1);
for i = 1:N
    D = (o_un(i,1) - o(i,1));
    diff_sq(i,:) = D^2;
end
diff_sq_sum = sum(diff_sq,1);
RMSE = sqrt(diff_sq_sum/N);

%calculate PSNR
peaksnr = psnr(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate SSIM
ssimval = ssim(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate CC
ccval = corr2(scaled_image, reconIm);

%calculate M/N
MNratio = M/N;

%show the rescaled image
figure;
subplot(1,2,1); imshow(scaled_image);
title('Rescaled image');

%show the reconstructed image
subplot(1,2,2); imshow(reconIm);
title(['Reconstructed image']);

```



```

%Security analysis
%histogram analysis
figure; subplot(1,2,1);
imhist(y); title('histogram of y');
[ycounts, ybinLocations] = imhist(y);
subplot(1,2,2);
imhist(scaled_image); title('histogram of image');
[imcounts, imbinLocations] = imhist(scaled_image);%
title('histogram of image');

%image entropy
y_entropy = entropy(y);

%histogram variance
imdata=reshape(transpose(scaled_image),1,[]);
v = var(ycounts);
vim = var(imcounts);

%differential attack analysis: NPCR & UACI
img_chg = image;
img_chg(1,1) = 1;
y_chg = zeros(M,1);
for ip = 1:M
    mask = H(:, :, ip);

    dctsamp = mask;

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = img_chg;
    temp(dctsamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y_chg(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
y = round(255.*y);
y_chg = round(255.*y_chg);
D = 0;
diffsum = 0;
for i=1:M
    if(y(i)~=y_chg(i))
        D = D + 1;
    end
    diffsum = diffsum + abs(y(i) - y_chg(i))/255;
end
NPCR = (D/M)*100;
UACI = 100*diffsum/M;

```

```

%tabulate results
T = table(MNratio, RMSE, peaksnr, ssimval, ccval,
endmask, endrecon);
disp(T);

singlepix_chaotic_logistic.m

clear all
addpath(genpath('l1magic'))

% Simulation using test image
image = rgb2gray(im2double(imread('192.png')));
%image = im2double(imread('cameraman.tif'));

res = 64; %set resolution
N = res^2; %number of pixels = res^2
M = 1*N; %number of sampling measurements
phi = zeros(M,N); %phi = measurement matrix A
y = zeros(M,1);

image = imresize(image, [res,res]); %resize image to
the mask resolution

%create M res x res chaotic masks by reformatting
the logistic map to matrix
r = 3.8; % r parameter for chaotic regime
csize = M*N; % size of chaotic array
x(1)= 0.4; % initial value
for i=1:csize-1
    x(i+1) = r*x(i)*(1-x(i));
end
cmat=vec2mat(x, N);
cmat(cmat<0.5) = 0;
cmat(cmat>=0.5) = 1;

%find y
startmask = tic; %start stopwatch
for ip = 1:M
    %arrange chaotic mask pattern into res x res
matrix
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(cmat(ip,:),res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);

    %reshape each chaotic mask to the size of the
image
    %csamp = imresize(mask,size(image),'nearest');

    csamp = mask;

```

```

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = image;
    temp(csamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
endmask = toc(startmask); %stop stopwatch and record
the reading time

%solve and reconstruct image
% Find x, image representation --> estIm
% y = Ax
% x = A-1*y = A\y --> inverse A
% Note: x = img0/estIm (Nx1), A = phi (MxN), y =
aver (Mx1)
startrecon = tic; %start stopwatch

%get phi using correct seed
r = 3.8; % r parameter for chaotic regime
csize = M*N; % size of chaotic array
x(1)= 0.4; % initial value (seed)
for i=1:csize-1
    x(i+1) = r*x(i)*(1-x(i));
end
cmat=vec2mat(x,N);
cmat(cmat<0.5) = 0;
cmat(cmat>=0.5) = 1;
for ip = 1:M
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(cmat(ip,:),res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);
    phi(ip,:) = cmat(ip,:);
end

invphi = pinv(phi);%pinv(A) returns the Moore-
Penrose Pseudoinverse of matrix A.
im0 = invphi*y;%initial solution
estIm = lldantzig_pd(im0, phi, [], y, 0.01, 1e-4,2);

% Reconstruct image
reconIm = vec2mat(estIm,res);
reconIm = (reconIm-
min(min(reconIm)))/(max(max(reconIm))-
min(min(reconIm)));%normalize image

```

```

endrecon = toc(startrecon); %end stopwatch and
record reconstruction time

%calculate RMSE
A = zeros(res,res);
scaled_image = imresize(image,size(A));
o = vec2mat(scaled_image,1);
o_un = vec2mat(reconIm,1);
for i = 1:N
    diff = (o_un(i,1) - o(i,1));
    diff_sq(i,:) = diff^2;
end
diff_sq_sum = sum(diff_sq,1);
RMSE = sqrt(diff_sq_sum/N);

%calculate PSNR
peaksnr = psnr(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate SSIM
ssimval = ssim(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate CC
ccval = corr2(scaled_image, reconIm);

%calculate M/N
MNratio = M/N;

%show the rescaled image
figure;
subplot(1,2,1); imshow(scaled_image);
title('Rescaled image');

%show the reconstructed image
subplot(1,2,2); imshow(reconIm);
title(['Reconstructed image']);

%Security analysis
%histogram analysis
figure; subplot(1,2,1);
imhist(y); title('histogram of y');
[ycounts, ybinLocations] = imhist(y);
subplot(1,2,2);
imhist(scaled_image); title('histogram of image');
[imcounts, imbinLocations] = imhist(scaled_image);%
title('histogram of image');

%image entropy

```

```

y_entropy = entropy(y);

%histogram variance
imdata=reshape(transpose(scaled_image),1,[]);
v = var(ycounts);
vim = var(imcounts);

%differential attack analysis: NPCR & UACI
img_chg = image;
img_chg(1,1) = 1;
y_chg = zeros(M,1);
for ip = 1:M
    mask = H(:, :, ip);

    csamp = mask;

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = img_chg;
    temp(csamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y_chg(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
y = round(255.*y);
y_chg = round(255.*y_chg);
D = 0;
diffsum = 0;
for i=1:M
    if(y(i)~=y_chg(i))
        D = D + 1;
    end
    diffsum = diffsum + abs(y(i) - y_chg(i))/255;
end
NPCR = (D/M)*100;
UACI = 100*diffsum/M;

%tabulate results
T = table(MNratio, RMSE, peaksnr, ssimval, ccval,
endmask, endrecon);
disp(T);

new_chaotic_drpe.m

clear all
addpath(genpath('llmagic'))

% Simulation using test image
image = rgb2gray(im2double(imread('192.png')));

```

```

%image = im2double(imread('A.png'));

res = 64; %set resolution
N = res^2; %number of pixels = res^2
M = 1*N; %number of sampling measurements
phi = zeros(M,N); %phi = measurement matrix A
y = zeros(M,1);

image = imresize(image, [res,res]); %resize image to
the mask resolution

%create chaotic RIM and 2 chaotic maps with M number
of rows
r = 3.8; %r parameter for chaotic regime
rim = zeros(1,M);
map1 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
map2 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
rim(1) = 0.8; %rim initial value
map1(1) = 0.9; %map 1 initial value
map2(1) = 0.7; %map 2 initial value

for rcount = 1:M-1
    rim(rcount+1) = r*rim(rcount)*(1-rim(rcount));
end

for mapcount = 1:N*M/2-1
    map1(mapcount+1)=r*map1(mapcount)*(1-
map1(mapcount));
    map2(mapcount+1)=r*map2(mapcount)*(1-
map2(mapcount));
end

%reshape the maps to M/2 x N matrix
map1 = vec2mat(map1, N, M/2);
map2 = vec2mat(map2, N, M/2);

%change the RIM and chaotic maps to bipolar
rim(rim<0.5) = 0;
rim(rim>=0.5) = 1;
map1(map1<0.5) = 0;
map1(map1>=0.5) = 1;
map2(map2<0.5) = 0;
map2(map2>=0.5) = 1;

cmat = zeros(M,N);
map1_count = 1;
map2_count = 1;

```

```

currentmap = 1;
for count = 1:M
    if map1_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M,:) = map2(map2_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    elseif map2_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M,:) = map1(map1_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    end

    if rim(count) == 1
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map2(map2_count,:);
            currentmap = 2;
            map2_count = map2_count + 1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map1(map1_count,:);
            currentmap = 1;
            map1_count = map1_count + 1;
        end
    else
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map1(map1_count,:);
            map1_count = map1_count + 1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map2(map2_count,:);
            map2_count = map2_count + 1;
        end
    end
end

%find y
startmask = tic; %start stopwatch
for ip = 1:M
    %arrange chaotic mask pattern into res x res
    matrix
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(cmat(ip,:),res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);

    %reshape each chaotic mask to the size of the
    image
    csamp = imresize(mask,size(image),'nearest');

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = image;
    temp(csamp==0) = 0;

```

```

    %record average intensity
    y(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
endmask = toc(startmask); %stop stopwatch and record
the reading time
%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%
A = transpose(y);
yy=A;
rng(2);
A1=rand(1,M);
A11=exp(j*2*pi*A1);%mask1
A111=A.*A11;
B=fft2(A111);
rng(4);
B1=rand(1,M);
B11=exp(j*2*pi*B1);%mask2
B111=B.*B11;
C=ifft2(B111);
C1=abs(C);
imC1=vec2mat(C1,46,46);
figure;imshow(imC1);title('The Encrypted image');

%decryption
% [s1 s2] = size(C);
% sigma = 10;
% Enoise = zeros(s1,s2);
% Enoise(:, :) = normrnd(0,sigma,s1,s2)+ i *
normrnd(0,sigma,s1,s2);
% C = C + Enoise;

D=fft2(C);
D1=D.*exp(-j*2*pi*B1);
D11=ifft2(D1);
D111=D11.*exp(-j*2*pi*A1);
F=abs(D11);
F = transpose(F);
%figure,imshow(F);title('The decrypted image');

%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%%
%solve and reconstruct image
% Find x, image representation --> estIm
% y = Ax
% x = A-1*y = A\y --> inverse A

```



```

% Note: x = img0/estIm (Nx1), A = phi (MxN), y =
aver (Mx1)
startrecon = tic; %start stopwatch

%get phi using correct seed
%create chaotic RIM and 2 chaotic maps with M number
of rows
r = 3.8; %r parameter for chaotic regime
rim = zeros(1,M);
map1 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
map2 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
rim(1) = 0.8; %rim initial value
map1(1) = 0.9; %map 1 initial value
map2(1) = 0.7; %map 2 initial value

for rcount = 1:M-1
    rim(rcount+1) = r*rim(rcount)*(1-rim(rcount));
end

for mapcount = 1:N*M/2-1
    map1(mapcount+1)=r*map1(mapcount)*(1-
map1(mapcount));
    map2(mapcount+1)=r*map2(mapcount)*(1-
map2(mapcount));
end

%reshape the maps to M/2 x N matrix
map1 = vec2mat(map1, N, M/2);
map2 = vec2mat(map2, N, M/2);

%change the RIM and chaotic maps to bipolar
rim(rim<0.5) = 0;
rim(rim>=0.5) = 1;
map1(map1<0.5) = 0;
map1(map1>=0.5) = 1;
map2(map2<0.5) = 0;
map2(map2>=0.5) = 1;

cmat = zeros(M,N);
map1_count = 1;
map2_count = 1;
currentmap = 1;
for count = 1:M
    if map1_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M, :) = map2(map2_count:M/2, :);
        break;
    elseif map2_count > M/2

```

```

        cmat(count:M,:) = map1(map1_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    end

    if rim(count) == 1
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map2(map2_count,:);
            currentmap = 2;
            map2_count = map2_count + 1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map1(map1_count,:);
            currentmap = 1;
            map1_count = map1_count + 1;
        end
    else
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map1(map1_count,:);
            map1_count = map1_count + 1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map2(map2_count,:);
            map2_count = map2_count + 1;
        end
    end
end

for ip = 1:M
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(cmat(ip,:), res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);
    phi(ip,:) = cmat(ip,:);
end

invphi = pinv(phi); %pinv(A) returns the Moore-
Penrose Pseudoinverse of matrix A.
im0 = invphi * F; %initial solution
estIm = lldantzig_pd(im0, phi, [], F, 0.01, 1e-4, 2);

% Reconstruct image
reconIm = vec2mat(estIm, res);
reconIm = (reconIm -
min(min(reconIm))) / (max(max(reconIm)) -
min(min(reconIm))); %normalize image

endrecon = toc(startrecon); %end stopwatch and
record reconstruction time

```

```

%%
%calculate RMSE
A = zeros(res,res);
scaled_image = imresize(image,size(A));
o = vec2mat(scaled_image,1);
o_un = vec2mat(reconIm,1);
for i = 1:N
    diff = (o_un(i,1) - o(i,1));
    diff_sq(i,:) = diff^2;
end
diff_sq_sum = sum(diff_sq,1);
RMSE = sqrt(diff_sq_sum/N);

%calculate PSNR
peaksnr = psnr(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate SSIM
ssimval = ssim(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate CC
ccval = corr2(scaled_image, reconIm);

%calculate M/N
MNratio = M/N;

%show the rescaled image
figure;
subplot(1,2,1); imshow(scaled_image);
title('Rescaled image');

%show the reconstructed image
subplot(1,2,2); imshow(reconIm);
title(['Reconstructed image']);
%%
%Security analysis
%histogram analysis
figure; subplot(1,2,1);
imhist(C1); title('histogram of final ciphertext');
[ycounts, ybinLocations] = imhist(C1);
subplot(1,2,2);
imhist(scaled_image); title('histogram of image');
[imcounts, imbinLocations] = imhist(scaled_image);%
title('histogram of image');

%image entropy
%y_entropy = entropy(y);

```

```

%histogram variance
imdata=reshape(transpose(scaled_image),1,[]);
v = var(ycounts);
vim = var(imcounts);

%differential attack analysis: NPCR & UACI
img_chg = image;
img_chg(1,1) = 1;
y_chg = zeros(M,1);
for ip = 1:M
    mask = H(:, :, ip);

    csamp = mask;

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = img_chg;
    temp(csamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y_chg(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
A = transpose(y_chg);
yy=A;
rng(2);
A1=rand(1,M);
A11=exp(j*2*pi*A1);%mask1
A111=A.*A11;
B=fft2(A111);
rng(4);
B1=rand(1,M);
B11=exp(j*2*pi*B1);%mask2
B111=B.*B11;
C=ifft2(B111);
C1_chg=abs(C); %changed final ciphertext

C1 = round(255.*C1);
C1_chg = round(255.*C1_chg);
D = 0;
diffsum = 0;
for i=1:M
    if(C1(i)~=C1_chg(i))
        D = D + 1;
    end
    diffsum = diffsum + abs(C1(i) - C1_chg(i))/255;
end
NPCR = (D/M)*100;
UACI = 100*diffsum/M;

```

```

%%

%tabulate results
T = table(MNratio, RMSE, peaksnr, ssimval, ccval,
endmask, endrecon);
disp(T);

new_chaotic_rsa.m

clear all
addpath(genpath('llmagic'))

% Simulation using test image
image = rgb2gray(im2double(imread('192.png')));
%image = im2double(imread('A.png'));

res = 64; %set resolution
N = res^2; %number of pixels = res^2
M = 1*N; %number of sampling measurements
phi = zeros(M,N); %phi = measurement matrix A
y = zeros(M,1);

image = imresize(image, [res,res]); %resize image to
the mask resolution

%create chaotic RIM and 2 chaotic maps with M number
of rows
r = 3.8; %r parameter for chaotic regime
rim = zeros(1,M);
map1 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
map2 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
rim(1) = 0.8; %rim initial value
map1(1) = 0.9; %map 1 initial value
map2(1) = 0.7; %map 2 initial value

for rcount = 1:M-1
    rim(rcount+1) = r*rim(rcount)*(1-rim(rcount));
end

for mapcount = 1:N*M/2-1
    map1(mapcount+1)=r*map1(mapcount)*(1-
map1(mapcount));
    map2(mapcount+1)=r*map2(mapcount)*(1-
map2(mapcount));
end

%reshape the maps to M/2 x N matrix

```

```

map1 = vec2mat(map1, N, M/2);
map2 = vec2mat(map2, N, M/2);

%change the RIM and chaotic maps to bipolar
rim(rim<0.5) = 0;
rim(rim>=0.5) = 1;
map1(map1<0.5) = 0;
map1(map1>=0.5) = 1;
map2(map2<0.5) = 0;
map2(map2>=0.5) = 1;

cmat = zeros(M,N);
map1_count = 1;
map2_count = 1;
currentmap = 1;
for count = 1:M
    if map1_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M,:) = map2(map2_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    elseif map2_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M,:) = map1(map1_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    end

    if rim(count)==1
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map2(map2_count,:);
            currentmap = 2;
            map2_count = map2_count+1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map1(map1_count,:);
            currentmap = 1;
            map1_count = map1_count+1;
        end
    else
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map1(map1_count,:);
            map1_count = map1_count+1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map2(map2_count,:);
            map2_count = map2_count+1;
        end
    end
end

%find y
startmask = tic; %start stopwatch

```

```

for ip = 1:M
    %arrange chaotic mask pattern into res x res
matrix
    H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(cmat(ip,:),res);
    mask = H(:,:,ip);

    %reshape each chaotic mask to the size of the
image
    csamp = imresize(mask,size(image),'nearest');

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = image;
    temp(csamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
endmask = toc(startmask); %stop stopwatch and record
the reading time

%solve and reconstruct image
% Find x, image representation --> estIm
% y = Ax
% x = A-1*y = A\y --> inverse A
% Note: x = img0/estIm (Nx1), A = phi (MxN), y =
aver (Mx1)
startrecon = tic; %start stopwatch

%get phi using correct seed
%create chaotic RIM and 2 chaotic maps with M number
of rows
r = 3.8; %r parameter for chaotic regime
rim = zeros(1,M);
map1 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
map2 = zeros(1,M*N/2);
rim(1) = 0.8; %rim initial value
map1(1) = 0.9; %map 1 initial value
map2(1) = 0.7; %map 2 initial value

for rcount = 1:M-1
    rim(rcount+1) = r*rim(rcount)*(1-rim(rcount));
end

for mapcount = 1:N*M/2-1
    map1(mapcount+1)=r*map1(mapcount)*(1-
map1(mapcount));

```

```

    map2 (mapcount+1)=r*map2 (mapcount) * (1-
map2 (mapcount));
end

%reshape the maps to M/2 x N matrix
map1 = vec2mat(map1, N, M/2);
map2 = vec2mat(map2, N, M/2);

%change the RIM and chaotic maps to bipolar
rim(rim<0.5) = 0;
rim(rim>=0.5) = 1;
map1 (map1<0.5) = 0;
map1 (map1>=0.5) = 1;
map2 (map2<0.5) = 0;
map2 (map2>=0.5) = 1;

cmat = zeros (M,N);
map1_count = 1;
map2_count = 1;
currentmap = 1;
for count = 1:M
    if map1_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M,:) = map2 (map2_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    elseif map2_count > M/2
        cmat(count:M,:) = map1 (map1_count:M/2,:);
        break;
    end

    if rim(count)==1
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map2 (map2_count,:);
            currentmap = 2;
            map2_count = map2_count+1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map1 (map1_count,:);
            currentmap = 1;
            map1_count = map1_count+1;
        end
    else
        if currentmap == 1
            cmat(count,:) = map1 (map1_count,:);
            map1_count = map1_count+1;
        elseif currentmap == 2;
            cmat(count,:) = map2 (map2_count,:);
            map2_count = map2_count+1;
        end
    end
end

```



```

        end
    end

    for ip = 1:M
        H(:,:,ip) = vec2mat(cmat(ip,:),res);
        mask = H(:,:,ip);
        phi(ip,:) = cmat(ip,:);
    end
%% RSA
%change y to 0-255
ky = 255.*y;
ky = ky - floor(ky);
y255 = floor(255.*y);
%calculate the value of p & q
rng(3);
temp=randi([3 30],1,M);
p=nthprime(temp);
q = zeros(1,M);
rng(5);
for count = 1:M
    q(count)=nthprime(randi([3 30]));
    while(p(count)*q(count)<256 ||
p(count)==q(count))
        q(count)=nthprime(randi([3 30]));
    end
end
n=p.*q;
%calculate the value of phi
Phi = (p-1).*(q-1);
%calculate the value of e
e=ones(1,M);
for count = 1:M
    x=2;
    while x > 1
        e(count)=e(count)+1;
        x=gcd(Phi(count),e(count));
    end
end
%calculate the value of d
d = zeros(1,M);
for count = 1:M
    rem=0;
    while(rem~=1);
        d(count)=d(count)+1;
        rem=mod(d(count)*e(count),Phi(count));
    end
end
end

```

```

% % %Encryption, %c=mod(m.^e,n);
cr=zeros(1,M);
for count = 1:M
    eb=dec2bin_rsa(e(count));
    k = 65535;
    c = y255(count);
    cf = 1;
    cf=mod(c*cf,n(count));
    for i=k-1:-1:1
        c = mod(c*c,n(count));
        j=k-i+1;
        if eb(j)==1
            cf=mod(c*cf,n(count));
        end
    end
    cr(count)=cf;
end

%Convert to proper intensity level
r = mod(cr,256);
K = (cr-r)./256;

% % %Decryption, %mr=mod(c.^d,n);
cr1 = 256.*K + r;
mr = zeros(1,M);
for count = 1:M
    db=dec2bin_rsa(d(count));
    k = 65535;
    c = cr(count);
    cf = 1;
    cf=mod(c*cf,n(count));
    for i=k-1:-1:1
        c = mod(c.*c,n(count));
        j=k-i+1;
        if db(j)==1
            cf=mod(c*cf,n(count));
        end
    end
    mr(count)=cf;
end
y_rec = (transpose(mr)+ky)./255;
%%
invphi = pinv(phi);%pinv(A) returns the Moore-
Penrose Pseudoinverse of matrix A.
im0 = invphi*y_rec;%initial solution

```

```

estIm = lldantzig_pd(im0, phi, [], y_rec, 0.01, 1e-
4,2);

% Reconstruct image
reconIm = vec2mat(estIm,res);
reconIm = (reconIm-
min(min(reconIm)))/(max(max(reconIm))-
min(min(reconIm)));%normalize image

endrecon = toc(startrecon); %end stopwatch and
record reconstruction time

%calculate RMSE
A = zeros(res,res);
scaled_image = imresize(image,size(A));
o = vec2mat(scaled_image,1);
o_un = vec2mat(reconIm,1);
for i = 1:N
    diff = (o_un(i,1) - o(i,1));
    diff_sq(i,:) = diff^2;
end
diff_sq_sum = sum(diff_sq,1);
RMSE = sqrt(diff_sq_sum/N);

%calculate PSNR
peaksnr = psnr(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate SSIM
ssimval = ssim(reconIm, scaled_image);

%calculate CC
ccval = corr2(scaled_image, reconIm);

%calculate M/N
MNratio = M/N;

%show the rescaled image
figure;
subplot(1,2,1); imshow(scaled_image);
title('Rescaled image');

%show the reconstructed image
subplot(1,2,2); imshow(reconIm);
title(['Reconstructed image']);

%%
%Security analysis

```

```

%histogram analysis
figure; subplot(1,2,1);
imhist(r/255); title('histogram of final
ciphertext');
[ycounts, ybinLocations] = imhist(r/255);
subplot(1,2,2);
imhist(scaled_image); title('histogram of image');
[imcounts, imbinLocations] = imhist(scaled_image);%
title('histogram of image');

%image entropy
%y_entropy = entropy(y);

%histogram variance
imdata=reshape(transpose(scaled_image),1,[]);
v = var(ycounts);
vim = var(imcounts);

%differential attack analysis: NPCR & UACI
img_chg = image;
img_chg(1,1) = 1;
y_chg = zeros(M,1);
for ip = 1:M
    mask = H(:, :, ip);

    csamp = mask;

    %project pattern sequence to image
    temp = img_chg;
    temp(csamp==0) = 0;

    %record average intensity
    y_chg(ip) = sum(sum(temp))./numel(temp);
end
% % %Encryption, %c=mod(m.^e,n);
cr_chg=zeros(1,M);
for count = 1:M
    eb=dec2bin_rsa(e(count));
    k = 65535;
    c = y_chg(count);
    cf = 1;
    cf=mod(c*cf,n(count));
    for i=k-1:-1:1
        c = mod(c*c,n(count));
        j=k-i+1;
        if eb(j)==1
            cf=mod(c*cf,n(count));

```

```

        end
    end
    cr_chg(count)=cf;
end

%Convert to proper intensity level
r_chg = mod(cr_chg,256);

D = 0;
diffsum = 0;
for i=1:M
    if(r(i)~=r_chg(i))
        D = D + 1;
    end
    diffsum = diffsum + abs(r(i) - r_chg(i))/255;
end
NPCR = (D/M)*100;
UACI = 100*diffsum/M;
%%
%tabulate results
T = table(MNratio, RMSE, peaksnr, ssimval, ccval,
endmask, endrecon);
disp(T);

```

#### dec2bin\_rsa.m

```

function a = dec2bin_rsa(d)
i=1;
a=zeros(1,65535);
while d >= 2
    r=rem(d,2);
    if r==1
        a(i)=1;
    else
        a(i)=0;
    end
    i=i+1;
    d=floor(d/2);
end
if d == 2
    a(i) = 0;
else
    a(i) = 1;
end
x=[a(16) a(15) a(14) a(13) a(12) a(11) a(10) a(9)
a(8) a(7) a(6) a(5) a(4) a(3) a(2) a(1)];

```